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ABSTRACT
Multiple claims have become a fixture of employment discrimi-
nation litigation. It is common, if not ubiquitous, for court opinions
to begin with a version of the following litany: 'Plaintiff brings this
action under Title VII and the ADEA for race, age, and gender dis-
crimination. "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
statistics show exponential growth in multiple claims in part because
its intake procedures lead claimants to describe their multiple
identities, at a time when they have little basis upon which to parse
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a specific category of bias. But increased diversity in workplace
demographics suggests that frequently, disparate treatment may in
fact be rooted in intersectional or "complex" bias: although stereo-
types for "women"have somewhat dissipated, those for "older African
American women"still hold sway. Complex bias provides a counter-
narrative to the currently in-vogue characterization of workplace
discrimination as "subtle" or "unconscious."
Despite the common sense notion that the more "different"a worker
is, the more likely she will encounter bias, empirical evidence shows
that multiple claims-which may account for more than 50 percent
of federal court discrimination actions-have even less chance of
success than single claims. A sample of summary judgment decisions
reveals that employers prevail on multiple claims at a rate of 96
percent, as compared to 73 percent on employment discrimination
claims in general. Multiple claims suffer from the failure of courts
and intersectional legal scholars to confront the difficulties inherent
in proving discrimination using narrowly circumscribed pretext
analysis. Applying "sex-plus" concepts does not address the underly-
ing paradox inherent in the proof of these cases: the more complex the
claimant's identity, the wider must be cast the evidentiary net to find
relevant comparative, statistical, and anecdotal evidence. Overcom-
ing the courts' reluctance to follow this direction requires the
development and introduction of social science research that
delineates the nuanced stereotypes faced by complex claimants.
1440 [Vol. 50:1439
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INTRODUCTION
When an employee alleges discrimination on the basis of sex, age,
and race, is she "crying wolf' or, as one judge put it, "throwing
spaghetti at the wall to see what sticks"?' Or is she expressing the
reality of today's workplace that diversity is tolerated, or may even
be valued up to a point, but too much difference opens the possibility
that an employee is singled out for disparate treatment?
Take, for example, the following cases. A female assistant stage
director at the Metropolitan Opera claims that she was subject to a
hostile work environment and discharged on the basis of her age,
gender, and sexual orientation.2 A file maintenance clerk alleges she
was terminated because she is an older African American woman
who is a Jehovah's Witness.3 A hospital material distribution
manager argues that he was fired due to his Italian ancestry, his
gender, and his disability as a result of diabetes.4 How do we react
1. Michael Bologna, Judges Warn Employment Lawyers Against Motions for Dismissal,
Summary Judgment, 19 EMPL. DISCRIMINATION REP. (BNA) 595, Dec. 4, 2002 (quoting
criticism of plaintiffs' lawyers by United States District Court Judge Ruben Castillo of the
Northern District of Illinois).
2. See Brennan v. Metro. Opera Assoc., 192 F.3d 310, 317-18 (2d Cir. 1999). The plaintiff
claimed that she was being discriminated against by younger gay men. Id. The court of
appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. With regard to plaintiff s
age discrimination and age-based hostile working environment claims, the court found that
no evidence existed to prove that the defendant executive stage director intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff because of her age; that plaintiff failed to show that the
defendant's reason for not offering her work-inadequate performance-was a pretext; and
that the three instances of hostility recounted by plaintiff had nothing to do with age, and
were, in any event, insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate a hostile work environment.
See id. The court also found that no juror could rationally find that the placement of sexually
provocative pictures of nude men in a common work area created a pervasive atmosphere of
"intimidation, ridicule and insult" adequate to demonstrate that she was subjected to a hostile
working environment based on her sex. Id. at 319. The plaintiff did not appeal the district
court's refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her sexual orientation claim.
3. See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 89-C-4468, 1990 WL 114478, at *4 (N.D.
Il. July 31, 1990) (granting summary judgment based on plaintiff's failure to show that the
defendant's legitimate business reason for terminating plaintiff-her continuing tardiness-
was a pretext for any form of discrimination).
4. See Fucci v. Graduate Hosp., 969 F. Supp. 310, 318-19 (E.D. Pa. 1997). The court
granted summary judgment for the employer because the person who made the discriminatory
comment regarding Italian males had no involvement in plaintiff's termination, nor was the
decision maker aware of such comment. Id. The court also granted summary judgment on the
plaintiffs ADA claim because the evidence did not support a finding that he was more likely
1442
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to these factual claims? Do we think, or perhaps more importantly,
do judges think, "give me a break?" Or is there any recognition that
subtle but real discrimination may be at work?
Claims such as these are a fixture of current employment dis-
crimination litigation.' Indeed, it is common, if not ubiquitous, for
opinions to begin with some variation of the following litany:
"Plaintiff brings this claim under Title VII and the ADEA for race,
age, and gender discrimination."6 Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) intake procedures guarantee that many such
claims will be filed without a factual foundation.7 Courts have
devised no consistent or fully articulated theory to address multiple
claims. The courts that consider such claims seriously rely on a "sex-
plus" analysis that does no more than acknowledge the possibility
of subclass discrimination.' Although scholars have made much of
the multiplicity, indeterminacy, and fluidity of identity, they have
offered little in the way of guidance for the resolution of the
everyday employment discrimination action that is a concrete
manifestation of postmodern legal theory.9 Empirical evidence
demonstrates that multiple claims are all but impossible to win,
more problematic even than single claims.1 ° In this Article, I under-
take to look more closely at claims brought by "complex subjects," to
than not terminated because of his diabetes. Id. at 319.
5. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1085 (3d Cir. 2006).
In his dissenting opinion, then-Judge Alito referred to multiple claims as a "rather common
tactic," and cited the following cases as support: Lawrence v. Nat' Westminster Bank of New
Jersey, 98 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 1996); Roxas v. Presentation College, 90 F.3d 310 (8th Cir. 1996)
(race, national origin, gender, and age discrimination); Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482 (7th
Cir. 1996) (age, religion, and retaliation); Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 1996); Ford
v. Bernard Fineson Development Center, 81 F.3d 304 (2d Cir. 1996) (race, age, and gender);
Evans v. Technologies Applications & Service Co., 80 F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 1996) (age and
gender); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996) (gender
and disability); Americanos v. Carter, 74 F.3d 138 (7th Cir. 1996) (age, gender, and national
origin); Castillo v. Frank, 70 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 1995) (age, gender, and national origin);
Meinecke v. H & R Block, 66 F.3d 77 (5th Cir. 1995) (age and gender); Johnson v. Office of
Senate Fair Employment Practices, 35 F.3d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (gender and religion);
Dashnaw v. Pena, 12 F.3d 1112, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (age, national origin, religion, and race);
Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 1993) (age and gender).
6. See, e.g., Bush v. Engelman, 266 F. Supp. 2d 97, 100 (D.D.C. 2003); Turner-Adeniji v.
Accountants on Call, 892 F. Supp. 645, 645 (D.N.J. 1995).
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part II.D.
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use Kathyrn Abrams's phrase.1 My goal is not to consider whether
such claims should be recognized, as has been the thrust of prior
scholarship. 2 By and large, the courts have accepted, either explic-
itly or implicitly, their legitimacy. Rather, I examine how multiple
claims should be analyzed to uncover what I suggest is the complex
bias that underlies them.
This project might be considered a part of the more generalized
body of recent scholarship articulating the view that there is
something very wrong with employment discrimination law today.
All of this work stems from the recognition that the federal courts
increasingly reject the vast majority of such claims at a time when
there is still substantial evidence of bias in the workplace. 3
Several interrelated strands of this critique can be identified.
The first, which in part underlies all of this scholarship, explores
the concept of "subtle bias":' 4 the proposition that decision
making in the workplace is infected by unconscious attitudes, which
create skewed results for protected groups, but discrimination law
is too crude a vehicle to tease out these biases. 5 This concept was
first articulated beginning in the late 1980s. Charles Lawrence,
Linda Krieger, and David Oppenheimer all wrote ground-breaking
articles that labeled the phenomenon, respectively, as "uncon-
11. Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479,
2481 (1994).
12. See, e.g., Bradley A. Arehart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in
Title VII, 17 GEO. MASON U. CIrv. RTS. L.J. 199 (2006); D. Aaron Lacy, The Most Endangered
Title VII Plaintiff?: Exponential Discrimination Against Black Males, 86 NEB. L. REV. 552
(2008); Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as "Catch-22": Why Identity Performance
Demands Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299 (2005). I address prior
scholarship in detail infra Part III.
13. See, e.g., Laura B. Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical
Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIs. L. REV.
663, 687-701.
14. I use the term "subtle" rather than "unconscious" bias, because it more accurately
reflects workplace practices and keeps within the framework of the antidiscrimination laws.
See Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective Rather Than Intent, 34
COLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 657, 658-59 (2003); see also Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as
Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1152-57 (1999) (arguing that negligent discrimination should not
be actionable).
"Subtle bias" scholarship has already spawned at least two recent law review symposia. See
generally Symposium, Behavioral Realism, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945-1190 (2006); Symposium,
Combating Subtle Discrimination in the Workplace, 34 COLM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 529 (2003).
15. See Selmi, supra note 14, at 659.
[Vol. 50:14391444
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scious racism,"16 "cognitive bias,"1 and "negligent discrimination."18
Another group of scholars has looked at employment discrimination
litigation from an empirical perspective, demonstrating that
plaintiffs have very little chance of success both at the summary
judgment stage and at trial. 9 The skewed outcomes have been
attributed not only to the difficulties of proving subtle bias, but also
to negative judicial attitudes and doctrinal limitations. Several
authors (including myself) have undertaken these projects explicitly
to respond to conservative critics, who see employment discrimina-
tion legislation as primarily creating a new kind of lottery for
protected classes, adding to the "litigation explosion," and disadvan-
taging American business by necessitating the expenditure of
resources on frivolous employment claims.2 °
16. Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-23 (1987).
17. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1170 (1995).
18. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899,967-
72 (1993). For other excellent explorations of this theme, see Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a
Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009,
2018 (1995); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now ISee" White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva
La Evoluci6n!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLy 415,
421 (2000).
19. See Vivian Berger, Michael D. Finkelstein & Kenneth Cheung, Summary Judgment
Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
45,46 (2005); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs
in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 3, 5-8 (2009); Kevin M.
Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal
Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuD. 429, 440 (2004); Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 13, at 692;
David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California
Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates
for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 514 (2003); Wendy Parker, Lesson in
Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889,894 (2006); Michael
Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard To Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 557-
61 (2001); Catherine M. Sharkey, Dissecting Damages: An Empirical Exploration of Sexual
Harassment Awards, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2006); Laura Beth Nielson, Robert L.
Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, Uncertain Justice: Litigating Claims of Employment
Discrimination in the Contemporary United States 8-11 (Am. Bar Found., Research Paper No.
08-04, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093313.
20. For a more complete discussion of some empirical studies, see Minna J. Kotkin, Outing
Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 114 (2007); Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible
Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 962 (2006).
2009]
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A third take on subtle bias comes from the "behavior realism"
school. This experimentally-based movement relies on the social
science-based principle of implicit cognition: the theory that the
perceptions and attitudes that motivate action are not under the
conscious or intentional control of the actors.2 Legal scholars
exploring the relationship of this branch of social science to
employment discrimination find support for subtle bias in the
Implicit Association Test (LAT), which demonstrates the prevalence
of unconscious stereotypes.22 The IAT measures implicit attitudes
by comparing, for example, the response times for associating
positive words with African American faces, in comparison to
European (white) faces.23 Researchers have found that the IAT
reveals far more bias than subjects explicitly express.24 Normative
suggestions arising from behavior-realism include reconsideration
of affirmative action in the workplace and a more critical look at
doctrine that rests on some untested and intuitive notion of
psychology, such as the "same actor" rule, which posits that
someone who hires a member of a protected group will not thereaf-
ter evince bias toward that person.25
Another branch of the discrimination law critique comes from the
"structuralists." In essence, they concede the impossibility of sorting
out subtle bias in the individual disparate treatment case, and
instead call upon the courts to concentrate on the internal mecha-
21. See Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to
Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 Mo.
L. REv. 83, 102-03 (2008).
22. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REv. 945, 955-58 (2006); see also Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein,
The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REv. 969, 978-88 (2006); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmative Action,"94 CAL. L. REV.
1063, 1072-74 (2006). For a critique of the use of the IAT, see Gregory Mitchell & Philip E.
Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1030-
31 (2006).
23. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 22, at 1072-74.
24. See id. at 1072.
25. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 22, at 966-67.
1446 [Vol. 50:1439
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nisms that employers have put in place to guard against bias.26
Tristin Green describes this effort:
Recognizing that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
mainstay of legal prohibition on discrimination in employment,
falls short of addressing the problem, legal scholars have begun
to formulate a new paradigm of regulation that would impose an
obligation on employers-through legal rights or otherwise-to
take structural measures to minimize discriminatory bias in
workplace decisionmaking. This "structural approach" aims to
minimize discriminatory decisionmaking at the individual level
and to reduce unequal treatment in the workplace by pushing
change at the organizational level in work environments and
decisionmaking systems.
This approach looks particularly to the "new workplace," in which
long-term employment is not presumed, and in which strict
hierarchies have been replaced with team-building. In these
workplace settings, subtle bias can work to undermine opportunities
for protected group members, through day-to-day decisions that may
result in a definable adverse employment action only cumulatively,
or through harassment that never rises to the level that courts
consider cognizable. The structuralists see the role of the courts as
ensuring that employers develop internal problem-solving mecha-
nisms that can address these issues.28
These macro-critiques are all powerful diagnoses of what is wrong
with employment discrimination law. Subtle bias undoubtedly
infects decisionmakers in the courts and in the workplace. It may
well account for the meager success rates for plaintiffs. In this
Article, however, I want to offer a counter-story, or at least an
expanded narrative, that accounts for some significant part of the
failure of Title VII and its progeny: it is complex bias, rather than
subtle, unconscious, or implicit bias, that is at work.
26. See Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating
Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 862-63 (2007); Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 489-92 (2001).
For a summary of this literature, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the
Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5-7 & nn.10-20 (2006).
27. Green, supra note 26, at 850 (citations omitted).
28. Id.
2009] 1447
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As the workplace has become more diverse, simple discrimination
of the type envisioned by the statute has been somewhat amelio-
rated. The traditional protected classes may have even achieved a
degree of equality, assuming that they are, in all other respects,
like their coworkers and supervisors. Today, much of workplace
discrimination now centers upon the "complex" subject-those
whose identities place them within more than one disadvantaged
group and who therefore engender more nuanced stereotypes. In
other words, though the stereotype for "women" has been loosened,
the stereotype for "older, African American women" still carries
sway. What I will refer to as complex or multiple claims now
account for a substantial and growing sector in employment
discrimination actions.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I explore the
prevalence of complex claims and their relationship to subtle bias,
examine the paradox that they present, and suggest some explana-
tions for their growth that relate to both demographics and doctrine.
I provide empirical evidence that demonstrates a steady and
significant increase of multiple claims in the EEOC administrative
process. This section also empirically demonstrates that once these
cases reach the federal courts, they have even less likelihood of
success than single-claim cases, a result that can be traced in the
first instance to the EEOC's intake procedures. Part II examines the
"sex-plus" analytical framework that the courts most frequently
apply to multiple claims and asserts that it does nothing more than
state the problem. Tracing the history of the leading cases that
accept the "sex-plus" theory, I show that the recognition of complex
claims, as a matter of law, leads, in further proceedings, to the
failure of the employees' claims as a matter of fact.
Part III reviews the scholarly consideration of complex discrimi-
nation and critiques the dominant formulation of intersectionality
growing out of that literature. Much like courts' "sex-plus" analysis,
theories of intersectionality state the problem but do not address
how courts are to sort out the difficult issues of proof that they
create. Finally, in Part IV, using two recent cases, I consider these
issues of proof, particularly with regard to the showing of pretext,
and suggest modes of analysis that may lead to making complex
claims more viable. I conclude that because of the more specific
identity of the complex claimant, the pool from which evidence of
pretext is gathered must be expanded, for purposes of comparative,
[Vol. 50:14391448
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statistical, and anecdotal analysis. Moreover, expert evidence must
be developed to provide a nuanced narrative of complex discrimina-
tion.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF COMPLEX CLAIMS
A. The EEOC and Complex Claims
Complex claims-and their relationship to subtle bias-are
finally receiving some attention. The EEOC recently launched an
initiative known as E-RACE, an acronym for Eradicating Racism
and Colorism from Employment.29 In announcing this effort, EEOC
Commissioner Naomi Earp echoed the thesis that recently has come
to dominate employment discrimination scholarship: "In the past,
discrimination was explicit, [and African Americans] and women
were overtly denied job opportunity. While we still see some overt
discrimination like nooses in racial harassment cases, we now see
far more subtle forms of discrimination in the workplace."'
Moreover, subtle bias is linked to complex claims. In explaining the
need for the E-RACE initiative, the EEOC noted that
[n]ew forms of discrimination are emerging. With a growing
number of interracial marriages and families and increased
immigration, racial demographics of the workforce have changed
and the issue of race discrimination in America is multi-dimen-
sional. Over the years, EEOC has received an increasing number
of race and color discrimination charges that allege multiple or
intersecting prohibited bases such as age, disability, gender,
national origin, and religion.3'
The EEOC's acknowledgement of the increase in complex claims
has not resulted in a clarification of how they should be dealt with,
however. As part of the E-RACE effort, the Commission issued a
lengthy compliance manual designed to provide guidance in ad-
29. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, THE E-RACE (ERADICATING RACISM
AND COLORISM FROM EMPLOYMENT) INITIATIVE (2008), available at http://eeoc.govlinitiativesle-
racele-race-facts.pdf.
30. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Commission Meeting (Feb. 28, 2007),
http:llwww.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/meetings/2-28-07/transcript.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
31. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Why Do We Need E-Race?, http:/
eeoc.gov/initiatives/e-race/why-e-race.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
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dressing new forms of discrimination." With regard to complex
claims, however, it does no more than identify the issue. A section
entitled "intersectional discrimination" reads in its entirety as
follows:
Title VII prohibits discrimination not just because of one
protected trait (e.g., race), but also because of the intersection of
two or more protected bases (e.g., race and sex). For example,
Title VII prohibits discrimination against African American
women even if the employer does not discriminate against White
women or African American men. Likewise, Title VII protects
Asian American women from discrimination based on stereo-
types and assumptions about them "even in the absence of
discrimination against Asian American men or White women."
The law also prohibits individuals from being subjected to
discrimination because of the intersection of their race and a
trait covered by another EEOC statute-e.g., race and disability,
or race and age.3
This summary of discrimination law doctrine may be somewhat
overstated, given some courts' reluctance to recognize inter-
statutory complex claims.34 But more importantly, no guidance is
provided concerning what it actually means to bring such a claim
and the pitfalls that lurk in pursuing this path.
B. Empirical Evidence of Complex Claims at the Agency Level
Although the EEOC offers no explicit empirical support for its
reference to the increase in complex claims, some evidence is
available. The agency compiles a statistical report of the number of
charges filed each year by the type of discrimination alleged: race,
sex, national origin, religion, age, or disability.35 In its statistical
report, it notes "[b]ecause individuals often file charges claiming
multiple types of discrimination, the number of total charges for any
32. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL,
DIREcTIvEs TRANSMITrAL, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL 3 (Apr. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf.
33. Id. at 8-9 (internal citations omitted).
34. For a discussion of such claims, see infra Part I.D.
35. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, CHARGE STATISTICS FY 1997
THROUGH FY 2007 (Feb. 26, 2008), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html.
1450 [Vol. 50:1439
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given fiscal year will be less than the total of the ... types of
discrimination listed."36 As the numbers in Figure 1 reflect, the term
"often" is not used lightly: there are 20 percent more claims of
discrimination than charges, and the percentage is increasing.
The following table, Figure 1, shows the total number of charges
filed with the EEOC between 1993 and 2006; the number of charges
that claim discrimination by race, sex, national origin, religion, age,
or disability; the total number of claims; and the ratio of charges to
claims, indicated as a percentage. The year 1993 was selected as a
starting point because it was the first year that claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) were a significant factor in
the EEOC process.37 In addition, by 1993, the effect of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which allows for compensatory and punitive
damages as well as jury trials,3 had made itself felt, substantially
increasing the number of cases filed.39
Although the number of charges and claims have decreased over
this period, the ratio of charges to claims has increased substan-
tially. In 1993, for every 100 charges filed, there were 113 claims. In
2006, the number of claims per 100 charges rose to 123. Figure 2
charts the steady increase in multiple claims over the fourteen-year
period.
RGR FY IFY IFY IFY IFY IFY IFY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY
993 194 995 1998 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2904 2005 2005
TotalCharges 87.942 91.189 87,529 77.990 80,680 79,591 77.444 79.896 80,840 84,442 81.293 79.432 75.428 75,768
Race 31,695 31.656 29,986 26,287 29,199 28,820 28.819 28.945 28.912 29,910 28.526 27.686 26.740 27.238
Sex 23,919 25,860 26,181 23,813 24,728 24.454 23,907 25,194 25,140 25.536 24,362 24,249 23,094 23247
Natoal Origin 7,454 7,414 7,035 6,687 6.712 6.778 7,108 7.792 8,025 9,046 8,450 8.361 8,035 8,327
R.0ion 1,449 1,546 1,581 1,564 1,709 1.786 1,811 1,939 2.127 2.572 2,532 2,466 2,340 2.541
Ag. 19,809 19,18 17,416 15,719 15.785 15,191 14,141 16,008 17,405 19.921 19,124 17,837 16,585 15.548
Dl.abty 15274 18,859 19,798 18,046 18,108 17,806 17,007 15,864 16,470 15,964 15,377 15,376 14,893 15.575
ToalClaim 99,600 104.953 101.997 92.118 96,241 94.835 92.793 95.742 98,079 102,949 98,371 95.985 91.687 93,476
Cla~nn a
Percentage of
Ch..g.. 113.26 119.09 118.53 119.11 119.28 119.15 119.81 119.83 121.32 121.2 121.01 120.94 121.96 123.37
36. Id.
37. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 336
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,117 (2000)). The ADA was enacted in 1990,
but enforcement of the employment discrimination provisions did not go into effect until 1992.
38. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)-(c) (2000)).
39. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 19, at 433.
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FIGURE 2: Claims as a Percentage of Charges
126-
124-
122
120-
118-
116-
112
110
........
108 . . . . . . . . . . . .
1z, ~(4 <1ZN k
C. Demographics and Complex Claims
What explains the steady growth in complex claims? I suggest
that it can, at least in part, be traced to the demographics of the
workplace, and can be interpreted as reflecting, to some degree, the
success of antidiscrimination law. In a sense, locating discrimina-
tion or account of multiple differences demonstrates the distance we
have come since the enactment of Title VII. Here, a look at the
statute's history is helpful. It is well documented that Title VII was
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intended primarily to address blatant forms of exclusion of African
Americans from the workplace.4 ° Over the years, however, litigation
under the statute has moved from a job opportunity to a job
retention focus. Thus, a majority of cases now allege discriminatory
termination as opposed to discriminatory hiring.41 In some sense,
this change signals at least a partial success in creating equal
employment opportunity. Studies have shown significantly in-
creased representation of nonwhites and women in all employment
sectors following the passage of Title VII. 42 The workplace will likely
be the most integrated setting in which Americans now find
themselves-more so than housing, neighborhoods, or schools.43
Shifts in the demographics of the United States have also
increased the diversity of the workplace. Since Title VII was
enacted, the American workplace has become markedly older, more
nonwhite, and more female, with the percentage of women partici-
pating in the labor force approaching their proportion of the overall
population.44 A recent United States Department of Labor study
documents these significant changes in labor force participation
between 1984 and 2004, and projects even more dramatic shifts by
2014. 45 Figure 3 summarizes the study's findings:
40. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979); see also Alfred W.
Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L.
REV. 465, 465 (1968); Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VI's Regulatory Regime: Rights,
Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 379-80 (1995); Ronald Turner, A Look at Title
VII's Regulatory Regime, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 219, 230 (1994) [hereinafter Turner, Title
VII's Regulatory Regime].
41. Turner, Title VII's Regulatory Regime, supra note 40, at 236 (stating that by 1985 the
EEOC charges alleging wrongful termination "outnumber[ed] hiring charges more than six
to one. The ratio during the period 1989 to 1991 was approximately seven to one" (citation
omitted)).
42. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1110-11 (1991) (reporting that since 1970,
the number of nonwhites in managerial and professional positions has increased by 163.4
percent, and the number of women in such positions has increased by 157.8 percent).
43. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 1, 8 (2000) ("Since the enactment of Title VII, the workplace has become a
comparatively integrated social environment-compared, that is, to other places in which
adult citizens interact with each other.").
44. See Stuart J. Ishimaru, Fulfilling the Promise of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,36 U. MEM. L.REv. 25, 26 (2005); Mitra Toossi, Labor Force Projections to 2014: Retiring
Boomers, MoNTHLY LAB. REV. 25, 25 (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/
mlr/2005/1 1/art3full.pdf.
45. Toossi, supra note 44, at 26 tbl.1.
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Figure 3
Cm Civilian labor force by sex, age, race, and Hispanic oigin, 1984, 1994, 204. and projected 2014
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As shown above, the number of workers fifty-five or older has
increased 52.4 percent between 1984 and 2004 and is expected to
rise another 49.1 percent by 2014.46 These older workers now
account for 15.6 percent of the workforce and are projected to
account for 21.2 percent by 2014, with an annual growth rate of 4.1
percent. Women now represent 46.4 percent of the workforce, and
it is expected that their participation will continue to slowly
increase, while male participation will decline." Women who are
fifty-five or older will comprise 10 percent of the workforce by 2014,
a 120 percent increase since 1984. 9
With regard to race, the percentage of white, non-Hispanic
participation in the workforce was 80.4 percent in 1984; it decreased
to 70 percent in 2004, and is expected to further decrease to 65.6
46. See id. (also shown in Figure 3).
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 38 tbl.6.
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percent by 2014.50 Persons of Hispanic origin will account for 15.9
percent of the workforce; African Americans, 12 percent; and
Asians, 5.1 percent.51 The growth rates from 1984 to 2004 for
Hispanics and Asians are well over 100 percent.52
Some estimate that nearly 56 million workers will be over forty-
five years old by the year 2005, a 40 percent increase since 1994.58
The median age of the population as a whole is expected to move
from 34.8 (in 1978) to 40.7 in 2008.54 As noted, 2008 projections
estimate that women will comprise 47.5 percent of the labor force,
up from 46.3 percent in 1998." The participation of African
American, Hispanic, and Asian workers is projected to increase as
well. 56 An additional 6.9 million African American workers are
projected to have joined the labor force between 1998 and 2008,
representing 16.5 percent of all new entrants during that period.
5 7
The Hispanic labor force is projected to have increased from 14.3
million workers in 1998 to 19.6 million workers in 2008.58 Asians
are expected to have increased their participation in the labor force
by 40.3 percent in 2008.' 9 Concurrent with the increase in participa-
tion of members of all three of these groups, the participation of
non-Hispanic white workers is projected to decline. "[T]he share of
non-Hispanic whites in the labor force is projected to be 71 percent
in 2008-a drop of 3 percentage points [from 1996] and down 8
percentage points from 1988."60 Although projections estimate an
50. Id. at 26 tbl.1 (also shown in Figure 3).
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. Stephen Labaton, You Don't Have to Be Old To Sue for Age Discrimination, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2000, at HT.
54. Howard N. Fullerton, Jr., Labor Force Projections to 2008: Steady Growth and
Changing Composition, MONTHLY LAB. REv. 19, 30 tbl.7 (Nov. 1999), available at http://stats.
bls.gov/opub/mlr/1999/ll/art3full.pdf.
55. Id. at 20 tbl.1.
56. Id. at 30 tbl.7. Note that the statistics for Asians include the category "and other." Id.
57. Id. at 30. Although this figure is higher than the number that entered between 1988
and 1998, as a group their overall share of the labor force has remained at 11.5 percent
because 4.8 million African American non-Hispanic workers are projected to leave the
workforce during the same period. Id.
58. Id. at 28 tbl.5.
59. Id. at 27 tbl.5.
60. Id. at 30. Additionally, three-fifths of the population expected to have entered the
labor force between 1998 and 2008 are projected to have been non-Hispanic whites, less than
their share over the 1986 to 1996 period. Id. at 29.
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overall decline in non-Hispanic white workers, non-Hispanic white
women are projected to increase their participation in the labor
force more than any other group.6
This statistical picture of the United States workforce suggests
that the prevalence of complex claims will continue to increase. It
also indicates, as discussed in more detail below, that complex
claims will become increasingly difficult to prove.
D. An Empirical Look at Complex Claims in the Federal Courts
Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine the prevalence in
federal court of discrimination actions asserting multiple claims,
or, for that matter, how they fare in terms of outcomes.62 The data-
sets available from the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts code cases only by the very general category entitled "civil
rights: employment."6 The PACER electronic docket system does
not reliably record in employment discrimination cases the type of
discrimination alleged.' Other than actually to examine case files
one by one,6" the only way to determine the prevalence of multiple
claims is to look at reported opinions, which may raise issues of
publication bias.6
In one empirical study, Vivian Berger, Michael Finkelstein, and
Kenneth Cheung reviewed all published opinions deciding summary
judgment motions filed by the defendant in employment discrimina-
tion lawsuits in the district courts of the Second Circuit for the first
61. See id. at 30.
62. A new, very detailed empirical study casts some light on outcomes but does not
directly address multiple claims. See Nielsen, Nelson & Lancaster, supra note 19, at 1-3.
63. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS 51-53 tbl.C-4 (2005), available at httpJ/www.uscourts.gov/caseload2005/
tables/C04marO5.pdf; see also Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 13, at 692 (discussing the
Administrative Office data).
64. See Berger, Finkelstein & Cheung, supra note 19, at 52; Sharona Hoffman, Settling
the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REv. 305, 341 (2008).
65. Nielsen, Nelson, and Lancaster's study does entail an examination of a sample of case
files. See Nielsen, Nelson & Lancaster supra note 19, at 2-3.
66. See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A
Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW &
Soc'v REv. 1133, 1133-34 (1990) (stating that researchers often base their analyses on
published cases, while 80 to 90 percent of employment discrimination cases filed in federal
court do not result in a published opinion).
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nine months of calendar year 2001.67 They found that in 154
published cases, there were 275 claims, with 65 single-claim cases
and 89 multiple-claim cases." The fact that 58 percent of this
dataset consists of multiple-claim cases does not provide any
definitive information about the number of multiple-claim cases
filed, but it does suggest that these cases represent a significant
portion of employment discrimination filings.
What happens to multiple claims? Several empirical studies
have investigated success rates of various types of claims, based
upon reported decisions and verdicts. As a general matter, Kevin
Clermont and Stewart Schwab found that in the category labeled
"civil rights: jobs," plaintiffs who reach the trial stage prevail at a
rate of 39.5 percent.69 Studies of disability discrimination cases have
reported plaintiff win rates at between 3 percent and 8 percent.70 A
study of age discrimination actions demonstrated that plaintiffs
prevailed in 8.7 percent of cases.71 Only with regard to sexual
harassment does it appear that plaintiffs approach anything near
to what might be expected in litigated matters; 72 one study found
win rates of 45.7 percent in bench trials and 54.6 percent in jury
trials.73 None of these studies indicate whether actions asserting
multiple claims were included or excluded, and if included, how they
were coded.
My anecdotal impression, however, is that multiple claims fare
even worse than those asserting a single ground for discrimination:
the more claims asserted, the less likelihood of success. This may
67. Berger, Finkelstein & Cheung, supra note 19, at 51-52.
68. Id. at 64 n.73.
69. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 19, at 441 fig.7.
70. See Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 244-45 (2001); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A
Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 108 (1999); Hoffman, supra note 64,
at 308-10; Louis S. Rulli, Employment Discrimination Litigation Under the ADA from the
Perspective of the Poor: Can the Promise of Title I Be Fulfilled for Low-Income Workers in the
Next Decade?, 9 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 345, 365-66 (2000).
71. George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment
Discrimination Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 513 (1995).
72. The well-known Priest-Klein hypothesis posits that a party going to trial should have
a 50 percent chance of success. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 (1984).
73. Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 548, 570 tbl.2B (2001).
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occur because the multiple claimants present a paradox in that
without a doctrinal structure from which to analyze complaints of
this sort, judges seem to treat them as the child who cried wolf. 4 If
a person asserts so many grounds for discrimination, it is unlikely
that any of them are grounded in fact.75 This instinct finds some
support in the genesis of discrimination law.
Title VII and its progeny-the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA)76 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)77
-were intended to remedy discrimination against particular groups
that had suffered a history of exclusion from the workplace. An
employee who fails to situate himself firmly within a clear and
distinct category, but instead identifies himself as the sum of
various ones, may be perceived as not entitled to any particular
category's statutory protection. Common sense and social theory
both tell us, however, that the more categories of difference from the
norm, the more likely that discrimination will be an issue in the
workplace.78
In order to test my anecdotal impression, I conducted a limited-
but, I suggest, revealing--empirical analysis of multiple discrim-
ination complaints. In the LexisNexis database, I searched for
reported opinions on summary judgment motions in cases alleging
either race and gender discrimination or age and gender discrimina-
tion in the federal courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of
New York, over a one-year period between June 2006 and June
2007. The search yielded twenty-six decisions in which multiple
claims were substantively addressed. Of those, summary judgment
was granted to the employer in twenty-two cases; in three others,
only one claim survived. In only one case with multiple claims, or
3.8 percent of the sample, did the employee fully defeat the em-
ployer's summary judgment motion. If partial success is included,
the percentage of plaintiff success increases to 15.3 percent, but
74. Multiple claims seem to play on the federal judiciary's general hostility to Title VII
claims. See Stanley Sporkin, Reforming the Federal Judiciary, 46 SMU L. REV. 751, 757 (1992)
(suggesting that Title VII cases overload the federal docket).
75. See, e.g., Bologna, supra note 1, at 595.
76. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)).
77. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 336 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,117 (2000)).
78. See sources cited supra note 22.
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these cases typically will go forward only with a single discrimina-
tion claim.
This finding can be compared with more ambitious empirical
studies of summary judgment success rates in employment dis-
crimination actions. Berger, Finkelstein, and Cheung found that
plaintiffs prevailed in 29 percent of summary judgment motions
made by defendants.7 9 The Federal Judicial Center has recently
undertaken a study of summary judgment in general, analyzing
activity in 179,969 cases terminated in the seventy-eight federal
district courts that had fully implemented its electronic case and
docket management reporting system in Fiscal Year 2006.80 In the
employment discrimination category, it found that summary judg-
ment motions were made in 30 out of every 100 cases, and that
defendants prevailed in whole or in part in 73 percent of those
cases."' In the district courts within the Second Circuit, the success
rate was slightly higher at 76 percent.8 2 In my sample of multiple
claims, the comparable figure was 96 percent.
E. Why Multiple Claims Fare So Poorly
Why do multiple claims fare so poorly? I suggest several reasons.
The first relates to the administrative process.8 3 Many, if not most,
employees file charges with the EEOC without the assistance of
counsel.' The first step in this process is the completion of an
intake form by the claimant. As shown below, the intake form
79. Berger, Finkelstein & Cheung, supra note 19, at 59-60.
80. See Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, The Fed. Jud. Ctr., on Estimates of
Summary Judgment Activity in Fiscal Year 2006 (Apr. 12, 2007) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Fed. Jud. Ctr. Memo].
81. Id. at 6 tbl.3; see also Joe S. Cecil, et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment
Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 887-88 (2007).
82. Fed. Jud. Ctr. Memo, supra note 80, at 9.
83. See, e.g., Holowecki v. Fed. Express, 440 F.3d 558 (2d Cir. 2006), affid, 128 S. Ct. 1147
(2008) (discussing the process); Laurie M. Stegman, Note, An Administrative Battle of the
Forms: The EEOC's Intake Questionnaire and Charge of Discrimination, 91 MICH. L. REV. 124
(1992).
84. See Williams v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 458 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2006) ("EEOC charges
frequently are filled out by employees without the benefit of counsel .... " (quoting Deravin v.
Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 2003))); Ezell v. Potter, 400 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 2005)
("We recognize that employees often file an EEOC charge without the assistance of a lawyer
and we therefore read the charge liberally.").
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practically invites the filing of multiple claims that may lack a firm
foundation. Claimants are asked the following:85
Do you believe this action was taken against you because of:
(Check the one(s) that apply and specify your race, sex, age,
religion or ethnic identity.)
0 RACE El SEX 0l RELIGION El NATIONAL ORIGIN E0 AGE
For many employees, the temptation to check all of the boxes that
"apply"-in the sense of how the employee identifies herself-must
be irresistible. An older African American woman who believes that
she was unfairly denied a promotion, without any information about
the decision at her disposal, could be expected to check race, sex,
and age. This begins the path to multiple-claim litigation. Even if an
attorney is involved, the same result is likely, so as to guard against
the risk of dismissal of any potential claim for failure to exhaust the
administrative process.
The intake questionnaire forms the basis of the formal charge
prepared by EEOC staff and served upon the employer."6 Form 5
replicates the generality of the questionnaire: 7
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON (Check appropriate box(es))
El RACE El COLOR El SEX El RELIGION El NATIONAL ORIGIN
Although claimants are asked for a narrative describing discrimi-
natory acts, neither the intake questionnaire nor the charge form
distinguishes between multiple claims brought in the alternative
(for example, discrimination based on sex or on race) and complex
or intersectional claims (for example, discrimination addressed to a
subclass, such as African American women).' Assuming no action
85. EEOC, FORM 293, INTAKE QUESTIONNAIRE (1984).
86. See Stegman, supra note 83, at 126.
87. EEOC, FORM 5, CHARGE OF DISCRIMNATION (2001); see infra Appendix for a complete
version of this form.
88. See id.
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by the EEOC and the issuance of a "right to sue" letter,89 some
proportion of these cases find their way into federal courts without
any clarification of the claims. In fact, drawing from Berger's
findings, more than 50 percent of discrimination cases present more
than one claim.' In many cases, unless the issue of intersectionality
is clearly presented, district court judges do not bother to look
beyond the most simple narrative. They treat each claim as
standing alone, and in the typical summary judgment opinion, they
separately analyze the evidence proffered to support, for example,
first the race, and then the gender claim, without even alluding to
the possibility of a complex theory of discrimination.9'
One district court judge, seemingly frustrated with and hostile to
multiple claims, but at least cognizant of the different narratives
they may represent, attempted to develop a procedural structure
to address them. In Harrington v. Cleburne County Board of
Education,92 the court issued a "special order in cases of disparate
treatment employment discrimination in which more than one
proscribed motivational factor is alleged,"9 which was referred to as
"a rather common tactic."94 The order, which was to be applied in all
multiple-claim jury cases, required that prior to the final pretrial
conference, the plaintiff must amend the complaint to "eliminate
all claims of prohibited employer conduct except one."95 If the
plaintiff fails to do so, she has two options: she may proceed on an
"intersectional" theory, or she may claim distinct grounds for
discrimination. 6 Under the second option, the claims must be tried
separately to the jury, and the defendant may choose which claim
is tried first.97 Presumably for attorney's fees purposes, the defen-
89. See Stegman, supra note 83, at 148 n.148.
90. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
91. See Sabina F. Crocette, Considering Hybrid Sex and Age Discrimination Claims by
Women: Examining Approaches to Pleading and Analysis-A Pragmatic Model, 28 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 115, 140-42 (1998) (highlighting examples of separate case analsysis).
92. No. 97-AR-1831-E, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21805 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 11, 2000). The
plaintiff, an African American woman, alleged that she was paid less than whites and males
in comparable positions.
93. Id. at *1.
94. Id. at *2 (quoting Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir.
1996) (Aito, J., concurring and dissenting)).
95. Id. at *4.
96. See id.
97. Id.
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dant is deemed "prevailing" when a defense verdict is rendered in
any partial trial.98
Accepting an interlocutory appeal of the order, the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the portion of the order
that gave the defendant the right to decide the sequence of the trial,
but only because the district court failed to articulate some legiti-
mate reason for taking this tactical decision away from the
plaintiff.99 It also reversed the ex ante determination regarding
'"prevailing' parties," objecting to the trial court's attempt to "send[ ]
a signal" that it would award fees to the defendant if it prevailed in
either or both of the separate trials.'0 0 But the Eleventh Circuit
found that the district court was within its discretion in requiring
the plaintiff to choose between an intersectional theory and a
bifurcated trial, noting, 'This court has deplored muddled com-
plaints in employment discrimination and civil rights cases and
urged district courts to 'take a firm hand' in ensuring efficient and
clear proceedings on claims deserving trial."'0 ' The court commented
further that it would review the future application of the "special
order" on a case-by-case basis.' °2
Clearly, the Harrington trial court's hostility caused it to over-
reach in its attempt to bring some clarity to multiple claims. It
appears that the "special order" went nowhere: neither Harrington
opinion has been cited since the decisions were issued. But at least
the court directly addressed the possibility of an intersectional
theory, a concept that has virtually disappeared from reported
opinions despite the proliferation of multiple claims in discrimina-
tion cases. As I discuss below, the courts have basically given up on
the complex subject.
And to some extent, courts have done so with good reason. Too
many cases are brought that do not truly present intersectional
claims, but instead assert independent and alternative theories
of discrimination. At the time of her EEOC filing, the "complex"
plaintiff typically has little information upon which to judge the
specific nature of the bias she perceives. The EEOC intake proce-
98. See id. at **4-5.
99. Harrington v. Cleburne County Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 935, 938-39 (11th Cir. 2001).
100. See id. at 939.
101. Id. at 938 (quoting Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1027 (11th Cir. 2000)).
102. Id. at 939.
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dure invites multiple claims by not specifying the difference
between alternative and intersectional theories. °3 Although this is
not an easy matter to elucidate to pro se litigants, the EEOC should
take some steps to clarify its questionnaire, and perhaps provide
training to its intake workers on the difference. Even more impor-
tantly, once cases reach the courts, lawyers must take a careful look
at the intersectional versus alternative theories, particularly when
discovery is concluded and the case is approaching the summary
judgment stage. Although it may seem counterintuitive, as I explain
below, multiple claims create problems of proof that may be
insurmountable without a substantial investment of additional
resources.
II. A DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMPLEX CLAIMS: THE
"SEX-PLUS" ANALYSIS
A. The Origin of "Sex-Plus" in Disparate Impact Cases
Shortly after the passage of Title VII in 1964, courts began to
grapple with the analysis of multiple claims. Although some courts
simply dismissed the possibility of combining "two causes of action
into a new special sub-category" and thereby creating a "super
remedy,"'10 4 others looked more carefully at the likelihood that dis-
crimination could be directed toward a subset of a protected group.
The dominant mode of analysis became known as the "sex-plus"
theory. It was first applied in the context of class action or disparate
impact cases-in which statistical evidence could be used effectively
to show subgroup differences-later extended to the typical dis-
parate treatment case, and finally to sexual harassment cases,
where its application proved more problematic. In this Part, I trace
the history of "sex-plus" analysis, and demonstrate that even as it
grew in acceptance, it failed to account for the difficulties of proof
inherent in its formulation.
The case consistently cited for the origin of the "sex-plus" doc-
trine is Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.105 In Phillips, a woman
103. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
104. See DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo.
1976).
105. 416 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated, 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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who applied for an "assembly trainee" position was told that women
with preschool-age children would not be considered, although
similarly situated men were eligible for employment."°6 She brought
a class action suit to challenge the policy as per se discrimination.' 7
The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of class certifica-
tion and grant of summary judgment on the basis of defendants
showing that 70 to 75 percent of applicants were women, and 75 to
80 percent of those hired were women, and thus, women as a group
were not treated unfavorably.'0 8 Apparently, the plaintiff and the
EEOC (as amicus) chose not to argue the case under a disparate
impact theory. Thus, the court did not consider whether the defen-
dant's hiring policy, neutral on its face, had the effect of excluding
women.'0 9 If it had done so, defendants would have had to prove that
it was a "bona fide occupational qualification" for women not to have
preschool-age children."0
A petition for rehearing en banc was denied, with a strong dissent
by Chief Judge John R. Brown, in which the term "sex-plus" first
appears."' Chief Judge Brown used the term to describe the
defense's theory: as long as the explicit criterion is not simply sex
(for example, a policy that no women may be hired), but sex and an
additional job requirement, the discrimination may be lawful based
upon the second unprotected criterion, thus making it unnecessary
to prove a "business justification.""' 2 The dissent points out the
absurdity of this theory, noting that by adding nonsex factors that
exclude many women, the "rankest sort" of discrimination would be
sanctioned." 3
The Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion, without
ever mentioning "sex-plus.""' 4 In one paragraph, the Court held that
the adoption of one policy for women with children and another for
106. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 2, reh'g denied, 416 F.2d 1257 (5th
Cir. 1969).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 3.
110. See id. at 2.
111. See Phillips, 416 F.2d at 1260 (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 1261.
113. See id. at 1260 & n.10 ("Of course the 'plus' could not be one of the other statutory
categories of race, religion, national origin, etc.").
114. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
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men with children triggered the requirement that a defendant-
employer prove a "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ).1
15
Justice Marshall, in his concurrence, would have gone further-he
suggested that any attempt to legitimate this policy would play
upon the exact stereotypes that Title VII was intended to eliminate:
that child care responsibilities are attributable only to women.
1 6
In Phillips, the Court framed the "sex-plus" analysis in the
context of a clear policy that was only one step removed from a per
se "no women" rule in hiring. Deciding cases such as this became a
clear-cut matter: was the additional hiring criterion "job related"?
Unlike the typical "disparate impact" case, plaintiffs did not even
need to show that a neutral policy-such as minimum height
requirements--disproportionately excluded women.1 7 Neither in
Phillips nor in any case decided since then did the Supreme Court
characterize this analysis as a "sex-plus" theory."'
The Phillips Court attempted to distinguish and analyze three
types of policies: (1) no women; (2) only some women, but not others;
and (3) policies that said nothing about women but had the effect of
excluding them. Regarding the first type of policy, the only defense
is to establish that the policy's requirement is a BFOQ."9 Regarding
the second type, the Court rejected the defense that the policy only
excludes some women, but still found the BFOQ defense appropriate
if applicable. 20 Regarding the third type, an employer can defend on
the grounds that the policy does not exclude women, in addition to
the BFOQ defense. 121
115. Id. at 544.
116. Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring).
117. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977) (upholding the district
court's finding that an Alabama statute specifying minimum height and weight requirements
for employment as a state prison guard disproportionately excluded women, and therefore,
constituted a Title VII violation: to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, "a plaintiff
need only show that the facially neutral standards in question select applicants for hire in a
significantly discriminatory pattern" (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971))).
118. The very same analysis was used more than twenty years later in a class action suit
in United Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991), in which the Court
invalidated a policy barring all fertile women from jobs involving lead exposure, noting that
it had faced a "conceptually similar situation" in Phillips. Id. at 198.
119. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544.
120. See id.
121. See id.
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In the wake of Phillips, lower courts invalidated other policies
that on their face created different employment standards for
women than for men. For example, airline policies that required the
termination of female but not male flight attendants who married
were successfully challenged, and at least one court relied on a "sex-
plus" analysis, citing Phillips.122 Other lower courts struck down
policies involving refusals to hire married women123 and termina-
tions of single pregnant women. 124 These early cases hold in common
122. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc. 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971) (holding that an airline no-marriage rule imposed exclusively on
stewardesses, but never on stewards, violated Title VII, and stating that Title VII analysis
"is not confined to explicit discrimination based 'solely' on sex," and that therefore,
discrimination was "not to be tolerated under the guise of physical properties possessed by
one sex or through the unequal application of a seemingly neutral company policy"). But see
Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892, 893 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977)
(rejecting a "sex-plus" analysis, and denying plaintiffs sex discrimination claim, on the basis
that one protected class of Title VII was not discountenanced in favor of another such class
by the stewardess no-marriage rule: because only women were employed in the position of
stewardess, any discrimination resulting from a rule barring married women from such
employment was not between men and women, but only between married women and
unmarried women).
123. See, e.g., Jurinko v. Weigand Co., 331 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Pa. 1971), affd in part and
modified in part, 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir. 1973). In this case, plaintiffs were employed by the
defendant company for several years until 1953, when they were fired due to the company
policy of discharging and not hiring married women instituted at the close of World War II
for the purpose of providing jobs for men. Id. at 1185. In 1965, after the passage of the Civil
Rights Act, plaintiffs sought reemployment by the company, but were told the company was
not hiring. Id. at 1185-86. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully pursued reemployment by defendant many
times until 1969 and then filed suit alleging they were discriminated against as married
women. Id. at 1186. The court rejected the defendant's contention "that if it pursued a
discriminatory policy, it was directed to married women rather than women [in general] and
was therefore not 'on the basis of sex." Id. at 1187. Citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta, 400
U.S. 542 (1971), the court stated that "[i]f the company discriminates against married women,
but not against married men, the variable becomes women, and the discrimination, based on
solely sexual distinctions, invidious and unlawful." Id. The defendant offered no BFOQ
distinction between married men and married women. Id. at 1187 n.6. The court then found
that, although there was no general policy of discriminatory hiring of married women based
on the statistical evidence of the company's hiring practices, "the evidence of the company's
extensive hiring of men during a period when the plaintiffs, with prior experience and good
work records, were actively seeking employment from the company" supported an inference
of discrimination which the defendant was unable to rebut with a BFOQ. Id. at 1187-88.
124. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364,367-70 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 917 (1977) (rejecting the contention that to succeed on her Title VII claim, plaintiff, who
was demoted for being unmarried and pregnant, needed to prove that, had she been a male
expectant parent, she would have been treated differently by the defendant company; and
determining that pregnancy could not be equated with the condition of "expectant parent" in
a male, but was a "condition unique to women, so that termination of employment because
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a largely unspoken reliance on stereotypical thinking about women.
The policies at issue represented societal notions of women's
appropriate place in the workforce: women with young children
should not be working, and married women should not be flying
around the country, flirting with businessmen. Doctrinal problems
arose, however, when the stereotypes became less clear. The courts
put the brakes on "sex-plus" analysis as the gender-based subgroup
stereotypes became less obviously apparent.
Hairstyle was one such breaking point: when male plaintiffs
challenged policies that required short hair for them but not for
women, the line-drawing began. In several cases, it was held that
because hair length is not an immutable sex characteristic or a con-
stitutionally-protected activity such as marriage or child rearing,
these grooming policies were not a violation of Title VII.' 25 In
Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., the male plaintiff
was denied a position with a newspaper company because a
grooming code was interpreted to exclude men with long hair.126
Here, unlike the earlier "sex-plus" cases, the policy was neutral on
its face, but there was no dispute about its disparate application.
Willingham argued that the "plus" was failure to conform to male
sexual stereotypes, just as in the first wave of cases in which women
were barred from employment based on female stereotypes.'27 The
Fifth Circuit repeatedly referred to "whether a line can ... be
drawn,"12 and relied heavily on legislative history indicating that
the congressional intent of Title VII's enactment was to provide
equal job access for men and women. 29 But hair length is not an
immutable trait, nor does it implicate a fundamental right, and
grooming requirements-albeit different ones-were applied to both
men and women.
of pregnancy has a disparate and invidious impact" on women). But see Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134-36 (1976) (holding that the failure of an employer to provide
insurance for pregnancy was not sex discrimination but discrimination against pregnant
persons). This decision led Congress to adopt the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 as an
amendment to Title VII. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. See H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 4750
(1978).
125. See, e.g., Earwood v. Contl Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976);
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975).
126. Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1087.
127. See id. at 1089-90.
128. E.g., id. at 1090-91.
129. See id. at 1090-92.
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The hair cases do not rest on any doctrinal foundation. The gloss
added to the "sex-plus" analysis seems to stem from courts' reluc-
tance to consider whether male stereotypes should bar employment
opportunities. Would the result have been the same if, for example,
a grooming code was interpreted to require that women-but not
men-have shoulder-length hair, thus excluding a subclass of
women who preferred shorter hair? Or consider a policy that re-
quired women-but not men-to have college degrees. It would be
difficult to imagine an employer arguing that this kind of policy was
not sex discrimination, since it would not exclude all women, lack of
a degree is not an immutable trait, and degree requirements do not
implicate a fundamental right. If not struck down on its face, at the
very least, such a policy would be analyzed on the basis of whether
the requirement was job related. Moreover, the hair cases demon-
strate that "sex-plus" analysis is merely a shorthand for looking at
policies that affect some portion of one gender group but not
another. It is noteworthy that dress codes were never litigated
under "sex-plus" theories-for example, women who prefer to wear
pants to work.
Thus, with regard to employment policies-the classic disparate
impact-type cases-"sex-plus" analysis met an early end. The
Supreme Court invalidated policies that could have been vindicated
under a "sex-plus" theory, but were not: for example, the denial of
accumulated seniority to female employees returning from mater-
nity leave. 30 In fact, as has been widely noted, few disparate impact
class-based discrimination cases are litigated today.' 3 '
B. The Expansion to Disparate Treatment Class
Perhaps spurred by references to immutable characteristics,
"sex-plus" was reincarnated in an entirely different formulation:
to address claims of individual discrimination involving African
American women. The so-called "sex plus race" theory was first
130. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (holding that an employer's facially
neutral policy that allowed employees forced to take a leave of absence from work because of
any disease or disability other than pregnancy to retain accumulated seniority and accrue
seniority while on leave, but that disallowed an employee who takes a leave for pregnancy to
retain accumulated seniority or accrue seniority, violated Title VII).
131. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 42, at 984, 989 tbl.2, 998, 1019-21.
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clearly articulated in Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action
Ass'n.'3' There, the plaintiff worked in personnel for a nonprofit
organization, served as a union steward, filed many grievances on
her own and others' behalf, and unsuccessfully sought several
promotions.'33 In the last instance, she responded to ajob posting for
two field representatives, positions that were filled by a white
female and an African American male.' 4 When she learned that the
African American male had received a permanent appointment,
Jefferies circulated an internal personnel document to a board
member whom she thought would be sympathetic but who in turn
alerted the executive director that confidential material was
being disseminated.135 The executive director then terminated
Jefferies, who among other claims, argued that she was not
promoted "because she is a woman, up in age and because she is
African American."'13
6
The age claim was dropped, but the court stated that at trial "the
claims of race discrimination, sex discrimination, and discrimination
based on both race and sex were properly raised .... 11' The court
found no evidence of race discrimination, because an African
American person received the promotion, but on the sex claim, it re-
versed the district court's dismissal. 3 ' The lower court had relied
only on defendant's evidence that women held sixteen of thirty-six
supervisory positions, and that one of the field positions had pre-
viously been held by a woman.139 It did not consider the comparative
qualifications of the candidates for the position plaintiff sought. 4 °
The most significant aspect of the opinion, however, relates to the
dual claims. Jefferies argued that the only statistics relevant to her
claim that she was discriminated against as an African American
women were the number (in both absolute and percentage terms) of
132. 615 F.2d 1025, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing the history of"sex-plus" cases and
applying the theory to the matter at point).
133. Id. at 1029.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1030.
138. See id. at 1030-32.
139. See id. at 1030-31.
140. Id. at 1031 ("Here, the district court in no way addressed the issue of comparative
qualifications.... Indeed, the district court made no factual findings on Jones' [the one who
received the promotion] qualifications for the job.").
20091 1469
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
African American women promoted.14' The court adopted that
argument for two reasons. First, it noted that unless African
American women were treated as a separate class from African
American men and white women, African American women would
not be able to prove that the reason for the personnel action was
pretextual, and no remedy would exist for discrimination against
them. 4 1 Second, the court found that this result was "mandated by
the holdings of the Supreme Court and this court in the 'sex plus'
cases."'143 Discussing the Phillips case, the court in Jefferies held
that "persons of like qualifications [must] be given employment
opportunities irrespective of their sex,"' 44 and then noted that "other
courts invalidated company rules which singled out certain
subclasses of women for discriminatory treatment," citing a series
of "no marriage" and "no children cases.' 1 45 Jefferies distinguished
the hair cases on the ground that they did not involve immutable
characteristics. 46 Finally, the court concluded that if an employer
cannot discriminate against a subclass of women who are married,
he obviously cannot discriminate against a subclass of African
American women. 47 Therefore, the promotion of an African
American man does not defeat plaintiff's prima facie showing
because he is not part of the protected subclass of African American
women.1 41 Moreover, proof of pretext is not defeated by the more
favorable treatment of African American men and white women.149
The case was remanded for "appropriate findings of fact and
conclusions of law in light of this opinion concerning Jefferies' claim
of discrimination in promotion based on both race and sex." '
Despite its favorable holding for the plaintiff, there are several
glaring problems with the Jefferies opinion that set multiple-claim
141. Id. at 1032.
142. Id. at 1032-33.
143. Id. at 1033.
144. Id. (quoting Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971)).
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 1035. The Supreme Court quoted Jefferies with approval, albeit in dicta.
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 598-99 n.10 (1999) ("[Discrimination against
African American females can exist even in the absence of discrimination against African
American men or white women.").
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cases down the wrong course. First, the Jefferies court did not
distinguish between Title VII's disparate impact and disparate
treatment doctrines. The "sex-plus" rationale grew out of the
examination of policies that were not in dispute. The notion of
subclass discrimination was drawn from a defense that there was no
Title VII violation because not all women were excluded. 5' From
that defense, the court derived the principle that a policy that on its
face excludes only some women-particularly based on subcatego-
ries that raise stereotypes-is impermissible.'52 The equivalent in
Jefferies would have been a policy that explicitly excluded from
promotion not all women or all African Americans, but only African
American women. A class is not obviously defined by a policy.
Instead, a subclass is a posited theory of discrimination, in part in
response to the defense of diversity in promotion, and rests on a
stereotype that must first be proved. Thus, Ms. Jefferies must
demonstrate that other African American women were treated
similarly.'53 In essence, she must prove a pattern in order to
overcome the employer's justification for its decision.
Why did the Jefferies court take this leap? Indeed, Judge Randall
disagreed with the portion of the opinion addressing multiple
claims, taking the view that none of the "sex-plus" cases addresses
the use of two statutorily protected criteria as a basis of discrimina-
tion, and the recognition of such subclasses raises unanswered
questions about the operation of the traditional evidentiary frame-
work.' "In light of the novelty and difficulty of a combination
discrimination claim and the serious ramifications that recogni-
tion of such a claim would have on the ways in which it would be
both proved and defended against," she suggested that the case be
remanded for fuller factual development before appellate review.' 5
I suggest that the Jefferies court perceived that there was real
discrimination at work in the case but was stymied by traditional
Title VII analysis. Race discrimination could not be proven, and,
although the court remanded for additional factual findings on the
sex discrimination claim, it doubted that bias could be shown either,
151. See Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1030.
152. See id. at 1033.
153. See id. at 1034.
154. Id. at 1034 n.7.
155. Id. at 1035 n.7.
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given the number of women who were supervisors. 156 Nevertheless,
the narrative points to discrimination. This fifty-year-old African
American woman was a troublemaker: she advocated vigorously
for herself and others, repeatedly sought promotions, and, in this
instance, went over the executive director's head to a board member
when she felt that she had hard evidence of discrimination.5 7 On
the basis of standing up for her rights in this manner, she was fired.
Would a white man have been treated in the same way? Rather
than being perceived as a troublemaker, would he be viewed as a go-
getter, perhaps a bit overly ambitious, but deserving of consider-
ation for advancement? Would he have been fired for having a
confidential conversation with a friendly board member about
personnel policies? These questions form the subtext of the opinion,
and the court latched on to the idea of "sex-plus" as a way to address
them.
It was, however, a doomed effort. The district court's dismissal on
remand was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, with only Judge Randall
sitting from the original opinion panel.'58 The per curiam opinion
noted that the district court found credible the employer's evidence
that Jefferies was less qualified than the African American man
who received the promotion, and said nothing about the possible
outcome of the case if evidence were introduced to mount a "sex-
plus" theory.'59
Similarly, in Judge v. Marsh, 60 an African American female
civilian Army employee sought several promotions, and in one
instance was ranked third behind a white women and an African
American male.'6 ' Although her job evaluations were generally
positive, various supervisors had labeled her as "abrasive,' 62
"difficult to deal with,"6 3 and a "troublemaker."'" Following trial,
156. See id. at 1035.
157. Id. at 1029.
158. Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 693 F.2d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 1982).
159. See id. at 590.
160. 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986).
161. Id. at 773, 775.
162. Id. at 778.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 776.
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the court accepted the "sex-plus" theory of Jefferies, but with dire
warnings and only in the form of dicta.'65 It noted that the theory
turns employment discrimination into a many-headed Hydra,
impossible to contain within Title VII's prohibition. Following
the Jeffries [sic] rationale to its extreme, protected subgroups
would exist for every possible combination of race, color, sex,
national origin and religion.... For this reason, the Jefferies
analysis is appropriately limited to employment decisions based
on one protected, immutable trait or fundamental right, which
are directed against individuals sharing a second protected,
immutable characteristic.... The benefits of Title VII thus will
not be splintered beyond use and recognition.
166
After this arbitrary doctrinal limitation, the court went on to
find that Judge had not proven that she was discriminated against
on that basis.'67 Judge introduced some statistical evidence showing
that African American women were inadequately represented at
higher grade levels--evidence not described by the court. The
Army's expert testified, however, that no significant statistical
difference had been shown.168 In addition, the court noted that, "the
generally small sample size and lack of historical data further
undermined the evidentiary value of the statistics."'69 Judge is
typical of the fate of "sex plus race" cases after Jefferies: the courts,
highly wary of the doctrine, fail to indicate what kind of proof would
make out a violation, and are dismissive of evidence that is
introduced.
Despite Judge's injunction against the use of more than two
protected categories, the Ninth Circuit recognized the possibility
that discrimination may involve three immutable traits. 7 ° In Lam
v. University of Hawaii, a female of Vietnamese descent sued the
University's Law School for discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, and national origin, after she was not hired for a position as
165. See id. at 780.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 781.
168. See id. at 780.
169. Id.
170. See Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Director of a Pacific Asian Legal Studies Program.171 In its original
search, the hiring committee named Lam as one of four finalists, but
one faculty member opposed her on grounds that may have reflected
bias. 172 Because no consensus was reached, a second search process
began, while Lam challenged the procedures administratively
within the University and complained outside for a review, garner-
ing a good deal of press coverage. 7 ' In this second search, Lam did
not make it to the top fifteen candidates, only two of whom were
women and only one of whom had a last name denoting non-
European ancestry.174 The position was offered to a white non-Asian
woman, who declined, and the search was again cancelled. 175
Lam challenged both searches in court. The trial judge granted
summary judgment to the University as to the first search, and
after a bench trial, entered judgment for the University as to the
second search.' 6 The Ninth Circuit upheld the judgment after trial
as not clearly erroneous, but reversed the summary judgment
ruling. 177 One of the district court's justifications was that an
Asian male and a white female were among the four candidates
recommended after the first search.'78 After following the Jefferies
analysis, however, the court of appeals found that it was erroneous
to look at racism and sexism separately, and reversed the summary
judgment.'79
The Lam opinion is noteworthy in that it specifically asserted
that "Asian women are subject to a set of stereotypes and assump-
tions shared neither by Asian men nor by white women,"'' 0 and it
draws on legal theory to note that "the attempt to bisect a person's
identity at the intersection of race and gender often distorts or
ignores the particular nature of their experiences."'' Other than
171. Id. at 1554.
172. See id. at 1556-57.
173. Id. at 1557.
174. Id. at 1558.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1566-67.
178. See id. at 1561.
179. See id. at 1561-62.
180. Id. at 1562.
181. Id. (citing Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscriminatory Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antitrust
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 139; Judith A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Title VII,
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recognizing the complexity of multiple bias, the court offers only the
mere suggestion of evidentiary direction in suggesting that although
nondiscriminatory treatment of Asian males and white women is
irrelevant here, evidence of discrimination against either group may
be considered differently: 'We express no view on whether such a
one-way bar is justified in either some or all cases." '182
As in Jefferies, the Lam case came back to the court of appeals
after the district court entered judgment as a matter of law."8 3 The
only issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in
excluding the testimony of a female professor because she merely
recounted isolated comments not contemporaneous with the
decision-making process.184 The court reversed, apparently deciding
the evidentiary question it earlier raised.8 5 In so holding, the court
indicated that a wide net should be cast in ferreting out bias.8 6 If
the district court had permitted, the witness in question would
have testified about significant examples of bias against women by
male colleagues not directly implicating Lam: for example, remarks
that she (the witness) was too aggressive and emotional; concerns
about that class being more than 50 percent women; a suggestion
that the two women on the faculty bring food for a gathering; and
one professor's objection to sexual harassment policies in general as
interfering with "natural" interactions.8 7 In the court of appeals's
view, this evidence was sufficient to require a trial.' 8 Lam repre-
sents the high water mark in this entire saga-it is one of very few
"plus" claims to have met success. That success rested on the Ninth
Circuit's understanding that a wide net is necessary to capture
complex bias.8 9
Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1980, 79 CAL.
L. REv. 775 (1991)).
182. Id. at 1562 n.18.
183. Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 164 F.3d 1186, 1187 (1998).
184. See id.
185. See id. at 1187-88.
186. See id. at 1188.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1189.
189. See id. at 1188.
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C. "Sex-Plus" and Sexual Harassment
The third category in the "sex-plus" story concerns a different
form of disparate treatment: sexual harassment. In Hicks v. Gates
Rubber Co., 9' an African American female security guard alleged
racial and sexual harassment and retaliatory termination; a bench
trial resulted in a verdict for the employer.191 The Tenth Circuit
reversed the sexual harassment verdict, primarily because the
district court did not fully consider whether the alleged conduct
created a hostile environment,'92 which had been recognized by the
Supreme Court after the trial court decision.'93
Significantly, the court of appeals began its opinion by noting a
fact not generally relevant to a harassment claim-Hicks was the
only African American female out of thirty guards, and one of only
two African American guards. 94 The evidence of racial harassment
consisted of plaintiffs testimony that one supervisor, Gleason,
referred to African Americans as "niggers" and "coons," and made
one reference to "lazy niggers" that was apparently directed at
Hicks, and that a coworker called her "Buffalo Butt."'' The sexual
harassment claims were that a supervisor rubbed her thigh and
said, "I think you're going to make it," during her probationary
period, and on one occasion Gleason grabbed her breast, saying "I
caught you" after which she fell over and he got on top of her. 9 '
Another incident involved Gleason telling Hicks that he was going
to "put his foot up her ass so far that she would have to go to [the]
clinic to take it out."19 Other harassment was not obviously sexual
or racial: she was required to jump off a loading platform; sit in a
wet seat; was not permitted to take a lunch break on one occasion;
not permitted to sit during a plant inspection (which departed from
190. 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
191. See id. at 1408, 1411.
192. See id. at 1415-16.
193. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,66 (1986) ("Since the guidelines were issued,
courts have uniformly held, and we agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title
VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work
environment.").
194. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1408-09.
195. Id. at 1409.
196. Id. at 1409-10.
197. Id. at 1410.
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normal procedures); and was not warned of a broken step, which
caused her to fall and be out of work for six days and suffer
persistent pain thereafter.'98
From the employer's viewpoint, Hicks was not adequately per-
forming her job: she required four weeks instead of the usual one
week of training; she had a heated verbal exchange with a female
coworker and allegedly challenged another coworker to a fight,
which resulted in a three day suspension; and she received two
reports of unsatisfactory job performance before she was fired.'"
During her eight months of employment, Hicks filed five charges of
discrimination with the EEOC, the last charge claiming that her
discharge was retaliatory.2 0
The district court concluded that neither the racial nor the sexual
incidents were sufficiently pervasive to prove a Title VII violation.2"'
The court of appeals upheld the finding with regard to racial
harassment, but remanded for additional findings on the sexually
hostile work environment claim.20 2 It held that the evidence of
physical and verbal abuse-although nonsexual-the evidence of
supervisor Gleason's sexual harassment against other employees
should be considered along with sexual incidents pertaining to
Hicks in determining whether the environment was hostile.2 3
Finally, the court held that in considering pervasive incidents of
racial and sexual harassment, evidence could be aggregated.2 4 The
court relied on Jefferies for the proposition that discrimination can
exist against African American females in the absence of discrimi-
nation against white females or African American men, and then
incorrectly cited Phillips for the proposition that disparate treat-
ment of a subclass of women can constitute a Title VII violation.2 5
The district court was instructed to consider Gleason's racial slurs
alongside the incidents of sexual conduct to determine whether a
198. See id. at 1409-10.
199. Id. at 1409-11.
200. See id. at 1410-11.
201. Id. at 1411.
202. Id. at 1413, 1417.
203. See id. at 1416-17.
204. Id. at 1416 (holding that a trial court "may aggregate evidence of racist hostility with
evidence of sexual hostility").
205. See id.
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hostile work environment was created. °6 Judge Seth, in a dissent,
suggested that because the court affirmed the finding that there was
not a racially hostile environment, it was unclear what was to be
aggregated: "[T]he majority would have the trial court evaluate the
impact of the overall working conditions arising from whatever
cause ....207
Four years later, the Hicks case made its way back to the Tenth
Circuit-the district court having again held for the employer-with
Hicks claiming that the circuit court's instructions had not been
followed. 208 The district court saw its task as follows: "[T]he inci-
dence of ... racial harassment and sexual harassment must be
considered in combination to determine whether there's a pervasive
pattern of discriminatory harassment against the plaintiff as [an
African American] female, considering [African American] females
as a sub-class of females, 2 9 but did so merely on a review of the
trial transcript without holding new evidentiary hearings. The
district court's conclusion that all of the incidents, taken together,
did not demonstrate an abusive work environment, was held not to
be clearly erroneous. 2" Not surprisingly, without a more explicit
examination of what was meant by "aggregation" or an exploration
of what discrimination meant in that context, the district court
easily circumvented the intention that the case be remanded to be
looked at more carefully.
What is the subtext that led the court to remand here? It seems
fairly obvious. An African American woman takes a nontraditional
position-she is one of two African American guards and the only
African American woman. 21' There are other women security guards
with whom Hicks gets into verbal and physical conflict.212 After
the first of these, Hicks files an EEOC charge-she is thus another
"troublemaker. 2 3 And we can posit that Hicks may have been a
heavy woman due to the "[bluffalo [b]utt" comment, and the in-
stances she characterized as harassment that involved physical
206. Id. at 1417.
207. Id. at 1420 (Seth, J., dissenting).
208. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 968 (10th Cir. 1991).
209. Id. at 970 (emphasis added).
210. See id. at 971-73.
211. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1408-09.
212. Id. at 1410.
213. Id.
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activity-being required to jump, and to stand instead of sit.214
Perhaps the court of appeals perceived the stereotypes at work
here-all the racial and sexual hostility of a white supervisor were
directed at Hicks.
Other than pointing out the possibility of subgroup stereotyping,
though, the application of "sex-plus" analysis makes no doctrinal
sense in harassment cases. "Sex-plus" in the gender-race context is
necessary to distinguish a plaintiff from African American men and
white women who receive promotions, for example. Harassment
claims, on the other hand, are individually fact-specific and do not
require comparative evidence. Hicks and cases like it simply
highlight the courts' failure to think seriously about complex claims.
D. Complex Claims Under Different Statutes
The next stage of the "sex-plus" saga involves the aggregation of
age215 and disability216 discrimination claims, brought under sep-
arate statutes, with Title VII claims. The statutes permitting age
and disability discrimination claims hold much in common with
Title VII, but have a significant distinction in the fact that they
define a precisely protected group. Under Title VII, men and
women, and African Americans and whites, are entitled to nondis-
criminatory treatment.217 The ADEA protects only those over forty
years old;21 the ADA, only those who meet the statutory definition
of having a disability.219
In Arnett v. Aspin,220 a district court recognized for the first time
a "sex plus age" claim in denying a motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiff, a government employee, was denied a promotion and
argued that all those promoted were women under forty or men over
214. Id. at 1409.
215. This is allowed by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-
202, 81 Stat 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)).
216. This is allowed by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
218. 29 U.S.C. § 631.
219. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,102, 12,112.
220. 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1994). This case also recognized one earlier case,
Thompson v. Mississippi State Personnel Board, 674 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
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forty. 2 ' After an extensive tracing of the "sex-plus" doctrine, the
court relied on the immutable characteristic theory elucidated in the
hair cases and found that the fact that separate statutes were
involved was "insignificant," but it did not consider the question of
particular stereotypes.222 The analysis it proposed simply required
a finding of a subclass demonstrating that women over forty were
treated differently than men over forty.23
Shortly thereafter, in the same district, a university employee
unsuccessfully argued that he was terminated on the basis of age
and disability, after the court found "no authority to recognize an
'age-plus-disability' discrimination claim under the ADEA. 224 That
issue need not have been reached, however, because the court found
that the plaintiffs hip injury that limited his walking to one mile
and to climbing stairs slowly did not make him disabled under
the Act. 5 Indeed, "the age-plus-disability" interaction has not
yet caught on. Another district court rejected such a claim, as
well as one for "age-plus-religion," with some attempt at reaching
a reasoned conclusion.226 The court made much of the fact that
Congress did not amend Title VII to add age and disability catego-
ries, but enacted two new statutes. To allow for aggregate claims
would amount to "judicial legislation." '27 But the court recognized
a more important rationale: "Unlike African-American or Asian
women, there can be no argument that there are unique discrimina-
tory biases against older workers with disabilities or older non-
Mormon workers."228 Whether that conclusion is factually based, the
court at least acknowledged that the perception of stereotypes is at
the heart of the "plus" claims.229 In this case, however, the court
expressed some skepticism about the plaintiff's degree of disabil-
ity.230
221. Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1236.
222. See id. at 1237-41.
223. Id. at 1240. The same result was reached in Good v. U.S. West Commc'ns, No. 93-302-
FR, 1995 WL 67672 (D. Or. Feb. 16, 1995), in a one paragraph holding.
224. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 907 F. Supp. 864,869,875 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1995), affd, 94 F.3d 102
(3d Cir. 1996).
225. See id. at 873-75.
226. See Luce v. Dalton, 166 F.R.D. 457, 459, affd, 167 F.R.D. 88 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
227. Id. at 461.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 460.
230. Id. at 459.
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As many courts have commented, the permutations of multiple
claims are many. But as multiple claims have proliferated, few
courts have engaged in any systematic or rigorous analysis of the
possibility of complex discrimination. As the aforementioned cases
illustrate, the courts have given little in the way of evidentiary
guidance on how such claims might be proven. With the sole
exception of Lam, which presumably was settled following the court
of appeals' second remand, the recognition of the viability of complex
claims has not resulted in successful resolutions for plaintiffs. In the
next part, I suggest that intersectional scholarship has not filled
this gap.
III. INTERSECTIONAL SCHOLARSHIP
The subject of multiple claims of discrimination has not gone
unnoticed by legal scholars. Throughout the 1990s, a number of
articles addressed the question of the interplay of race and gender
bias in employment discrimination, as well as in other contexts.
Largely written from a critical and feminist perspective, these
authors all called for a more nuanced interpretation of Title VII that
permits the aggregation of claims. Some authors used narrative to
convey a sense of the stereotypes at play in these types of claims.
But this body of work is actually of little use in analyzing the
quality of proof needed to prevail on such a claim. Indeed, the courts
have followed the direction suggested by these scholars in at least
recognizing multiple claims, but as discussed above, plaintiffs still
do not prevail.231 Moreover, these articles focus primarily on the
race/gender paradigm and do not provide a framework for the
recognition of differently conjoined classes, such as age and
disability.232 In this part, I will examine several significant works
that have addressed multiple claims.233
231. See discussion supra Part I.
232. For literature that considers age/sex claims, see Crocette, supra note 91, at 117-18;
Nicole Buonocore Porter, Sex Plus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women Workers, 81
DENV. U. L. REv. 79,87-90 (2003). For literature that considers discrimination against African
American men, see Lacy, supra note 12, at 555-57.
233. For other articles in this vein, see, e.g., Bradley Allan Areheart, Intersectionality and
Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII, 17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 199, 201-02 (2006);
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: "Intersectionality,""Multidimensionality, "and the
Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 308-09
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Kimberle Crenshaw was among the first to call attention to the
difficulties inherent in analyzing claims addressing race and gen-
der discrimination.234 Crenshaw argues that "intersectional experi-
ence" of African American women is greater than the sum of racism
and sexism. 235 Thus, she suggests that when African American
women claim race discrimination, their experience is measured
against that of sex-privileged (that is, male) African Americans;
when African American women claim gender discrimination, their
experience is measured against that of race-privileged (that is,
white) women.23' As one example, she relies on an early decision in
a case that challenged seniority-based layoffs in a company that
did not employ any African American women prior to 1964.237 The
layoffs resulted in all African American women losing their jobs, but
the court refused to recognize what it called a "super remedy" based
upon combined statutory classifications-not all women were laid
off, and the race claim should be consolidated with an action already
pending.238 She concludes that African American women may
experience discrimination similar to that of white women or African
American men, but often they experience double discrimination,
and sometimes they experience a unique form of bias-one explicitly
directed toward African American women.239 In later articles,
Crenshaw plays out the theme of intersectionality in several
contexts, but does not return to employment discrimination law.24°
(2001); Rosalio Castro & Lucia Corral, Comment, Women of Color and Employment
Discrimination: Race and Gender Combined in Title VII Claims, 6 LA RAZA L.J. 159, 162
(1993); Virginia W. Wei, Note, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination: Using
Intersectionality Theory To Address Title VII Claims Based on Combined Factors of Race,
Gender and National Origin, 37 B.C. L. REv. 771, 776 (1996).
234. Crenshaw, supra note 181. For earlier discussion of some of these issues, see
ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT 114-32 (1988); Elaine W. Shoben, Compound Discrimination: The Interaction of
Race and Sex in Employment Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 793, 793-98 (1980).
235. Crenshaw, supra note 181, at 140.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 141-43 (discussing DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 413 F.
Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976)).
238. See DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 143; Crenshaw, supra note 181, at 141-42.
239. See Crenshaw, supra note 181, at 149.
240. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1467 (1992); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242-45 (1991).
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Kathryn Abrams argues that assumptions underlying Title VII
doctrine operate to limit the relief that complex claimants seek,
and demonstrate the extent to which they operate to influence
courts to require such plaintiffs to disaggregate and choose among
the elements of their identities. 241 To this end, she analyzes the
judicial response to multiple claims, focusing specifically on
employment cases involving complex plaintiffs with "race and sex"
claims as well as cases involving "ambivalent plaintiffs." She
describes the latter as individuals who fit uneasily within the
category established for statutory protection because they not only
manifest characteristics associated with the protected category, but
also manifest characteristics associated with the category statuto-
rily assumed to be the opposite.242 With a discussion of shifting
characterizations of the female subject in feminist theory as her
foundation,243 Abrams focuses her inquiry on the willingness of
courts to accept the complex subjectivity of these plaintiffs and
whether they have offered an intelligible account of the kinds of
discrimination they have suffered. She ultimately concludes that
courts are reluctant to accept the complex subjectivity of these
plaintiffs, and that they offer no real account of discrimination that
241. See Abrams, supra note 11, at 2520-26. Abrams outlines four assumptions underlying
Title VII cases: (1) members of a protected group are easily identifiable; (2) in order to be
considered discrimination against a member of a certain group, the employer's judgment must
be applicable to the group as a whole, such that when Title VII does target discrimination
against a subgroup, its goal is ancillary to, and less important than, stopping the
implementation of discriminatory judgments applicable to the group as a whole; (3) actions
or judgments that are most readily understood as discriminatory are performed or made by
members of another group, thus, when confronted with actions or judgments made by an
individual in the same category as the person being discriminated against, it is assumed to
be the result of personal antagonism, rather than group-based beliefs shaped by broader social
structures; and (4) discriminatory actions or judgments are workplace-specific barriers that
hinder employment opportunity, rather than parts of a system of discrimination that shape
the consciousness of those subject to it. Id.
242. Id. at 2492-93 (suggesting that an African American person who might be viewed as
white, as well as a man who expresses a socially female response to sexualized talk or
conduct, would serve to exemplify those who fit into this second category).
243. See id. at 2482-93 (addressing different academic movements in feminism, including
equality, difference, and dominance theories and how the conceptualization of female
subjectivity has evolved; noting the trend over time for a less unitary characterization of
women as a group; and centering her discussion on the work of Kimberle Crenshaw and Judy
Scales-Trent-two antiessentialist theorists who combine poststructuralism's emphasis on
the multiplicity and intersection of constructing "discourses" and its depiction of a multifocal,
decentered self, whose articulation is variable and dependent on context).
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either explains the complexity of intersectional claims in their own
terms or "helps explain how they relate to the forms of race or
gender discrimination traditionally protected under the statute.244
This shortcoming, according to Abrams, does not provide stable or
insightful precedent for the recognition of similar future claims.245
Abrams provides an insightful discussion of the societal forces
at work in employment discrimination cases. She describes employ-
ment discrimination as being both influenced by and reinforcing
the societal hierarchy of racism and sexism, and addresses the
complexity of intragroup discriminatory dynamics by describing how
groups internalize the social forces of sexism and racism and how
these forces serve to create an intragroup hierarchy.246 Although her
discussion adroitly examines the societal influences that give rise
to the type of discrimination faced by complex plaintiffs, ultimately
she seems most concerned with the lack of explication provided
by courts; her interpretation of their failure seems to be one of
clarity and direction.247 Although this assessment is convincing and
elucidates much of what is not said or addressed in employment
discrimination cases involving multiple-claim cases, her suggestions
are not overly remedial.
Using an entirely different approach, E. Christi Cunningham
addresses the difficulty of defining complex plaintiffs under Title
244. Id. at 2493.
245. See id. at 2498.
246. See id. at 2504-09, 2524-26.
247. See id. at 2516. For example, when dealing with "ambivalent plaintiffs" in the context
of sexual harassment cases, she notes
what the courts explicitly decline to do is to look beneath biological or unitary
classifications at the more complex social interactions they seek to describe and
regulate. Were they to do so, they might see that not all men share
unambivalently in the qualities socially connected with maleness and that
discrimination by men against men does not parallel gender discrimination
against women but is, in fact, strongly colored by it.
Id. Although Abrams concedes that some courts have made some promising advances in the
direction of recognizing the complexity of the discrimination faced by multiple-claim plaintiffs,
she notes that their failure is one that relates to an inability to "come to terms with the
complex, and often unstable, arrangement of seemingly contradictory characteristics that
comprise the subjectivity of any individual." Id. at 2517. She suggests that these complex
notions of subjectivity should be "permitted to recast the courts' image of the Title VII
claimant" and "linked to a theory of discrimination that could locate them within the world
of wrongs Title VII is intended to right" in a move toward what she describes as a
"transformative understanding." Id.
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VII, focusing on the first prong of proof required in a discrimination
claim-the "protected class" criterion applied by courts in evaluating
a plaintiffs prima facie case in a disparate treatment context.248
Cunningham focuses on the complexity and individuality of personal
identity, and asserts that the first prong serves to limit complex
plaintiffs by ignoring the complexities of their identities in an
artificial manner.249 Specifically, she asserts that the inquiry into
whether an individual is a member of a "protected class" distorts the
substance and form of the prima facie test by evaluating whether
defendants knew that plaintiffs were members of the class, which
in turn leads to denial of standing to plaintiffs deserving protection
and an alignment of plaintiffs' identity with the form of discrimina-
tion alleged, which limits the likelihood of success of multiple-claim
plaintiffs.250 Cunningham also asserts that the alignment of identity
with the form of alleged discrimination causes courts to create
protected subclasses to fit a plaintiff's specific identity;25' this limits
a plaintiff's ability to be recognized as a self-defined individual and
a court's ability to recognize combined forms of discrimination that
an individual may experience.2 2 Her solution to these problems
248. See E. Christi Cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: The Myth of the Protected
Class in Title VIIDisparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REV. 441, 442-43 (1998).
249. See id. at 480-81.
250. See id. at 487 (illustrating this point with an Eighth Circuit case in which an African
American gay man alleged race discrimination because white gay male employees were not
dismissed for engaging in similar conduct, in which the court held that the plaintiff could not
be identified and protected under Title VII as a gay African American man because the
statute does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of homosexuality (discussing Williamson
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989))).
251. Id. at 474-75. For example, if a court was presented with an Asian woman plaintiff of
French-Vietnamese ancestry from Vietnam, it would have to find that her particular identity
was protected as a subclass under the statute. Id. at 477. Cunningham criticizes this practice
in that at some point in time courts may find the complexities of identity unmanageable. Id.
at 473.
252. Cunningham asserts that because plaintiffs are treated as members of a group defined
by a category of unlawful discrimination, the identities of plaintiffs are artificially limited by
courts. See id. at 480. For example, a woman of an unidentified race and age alleging sex
discrimination is limited to the identity of her sex. Cunningham notes that,
[n]evertheless, she may also have identified herself, for the purpose of her sex
discrimination claim, as a woman of her race, as a person over forty, as a woman
over forty, as a woman of her race over forty, or in some other fashion. These
identities would not reflect a category of prohibited behavior but would reflect
plaintiff's self-identification and how she, as an individual, may have
experienced sex discrimination.
Id. at 480-81.
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involves a rejection of intersectional theory253 and the promotion of
what she describes as "wholism. 254
According to Cunningham, intersectional theory is limited-it
does not capture the experience of everyone who may experience
race and gender discrimination; it focuses on group experience,
with a specific focus on the categories of race and gender; and it
forecloses the possibility of taking into account other aspects of a
person's identity, such as discrimination based on beauty, weight,
or ethnicity.2 55 By advocating "wholism" as opposed to intersec-
tionality, Cunningham attempts to account for the complexity of
human identity by not separating or parsing out aspects of it
according to the parameters of oppressive behavior, and instead
allowing plaintiffs to self-define their own identities, presumably for
courts to recognize the validity of their claims." 6 This presumption
suffers from a lack of foundation, however, as Cunningham fails to
integrate clearly her theory of "wholism" into her "prima facie"
prong analysis. She offers no guidance for courts on how to handle
the task of examining and understanding the "whole" plaintiff's
particular, and potentially multifaceted, experience of discrimina-
tion.
Crenshaw, Abrams, and Cunningham all provide highly valuable
insights into the nature of complex claims, and their work, whether
acknowledged or not,257 has undoubtedly influenced courts' increas-
ing acceptance of intersectional theory. Their work enriches our
understanding of the complex subject. But they do not confront the
serious proof issues that arise when litigants attempt to assert their
complexity in discrimination litigation.
253. See id. at 496-500.
254. Id. at 442 n.3 (defining "wholism" as "the theory that identity, when subjective and
empowered, is unified rather than multiple or splintered").
255. See id. at 496-500.
256. See id. at 500 (discussing "wholism" as a "theory of radical individualism" that "asserts
that there are no intersections").
257. A LexisNexis search reveals that the only case citing Crenshaw, supra note 181, is
Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994), and it is referred to in 532 law review
articles; Abrams, supra note 11, is cited only in Doe v. City of Belleville, 199 F.3d 563, 593 (7th
Cir. 1997) (involving male on male sexual harassment) and is referred to in 91 law review
articles; and Cunningham, supra note 248, is cited in no cases and is referred to in 42 law
review articles.
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IV. PROBLEMS OF PROOF: A LOOK AT TWO CASES
More and more courts have accepted complex claims from a
doctrinal perspective, either explicitly or implicitly, in the disparate
treatment context."' Nevertheless, both empirical and anecdotal
evidence, based upon a reading of reported opinions, suggests that
these cases are all but unwinnable, even more so than single-claim
cases." 9 In this part, I consider whether multiple-claim cases lose
for legitimate reasons-that is, do claimants bring them unthink-
ingly or even out of desperation, when it is necessary to distinguish
the plaintiff from other "single" protected group members for whom
it can be shown were not victims of discrimination? Alternatively,
do multiple-claim cases fail because the courts have so constrained
the universe of available proof that it is impossible for plaintiffs to
tease out a culture of subtle bias against those who bring the most
diversity to the workplace? The following two cases are illustrative
of this conundrum.
A. Jeffers v. Thompson
Jeffers v. Thompson26 is a case in which the court seemed to have
perceived some form of subtle discrimination at work, but never-
theless dismissed the complex claim. Jeffers, a fifty-five-year-old
African American woman, claimed that she had been denied a
promotion "because of her race, her gender, her race and gender,
combined, and her age." '261 While she was serving as the co-director
of the Office of Program and Organizational Services in the
Medicaid Bureau, Health Care Financing Administration, she
applied for two different promotions at the U.S. Department of
258. In addition, there has been a recent growth of "sex-plus" cases relating to subclasses
of women with young children. See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist.,
365 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2005); Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d 428,438 n.8 (6th
Cir. 2004); Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25898, at **12-14 (E.D. Mich. 2007); Gee-Thomas v. Cingular Wireless, 324 F. Supp.
2d 875, 884 n.6 (M.D. Tenn. 2004).
259. See supra Part I.
260. 264 F. Supp. 2d 314 (D. Md. 2003).
261. Id. at 319.
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Health and Human Services (HHS).262 She was the only African
American and the oldest person among the seven persons ranked as
"best qualified" for the position.263 A forty-four-year-old white man
was appointed to one position; a fifty-year-old white woman to the
other.2 Considering HHS's motion for summary judgment, the
court analyzed each of the claims separately. Because there was
direct evidence of discrimination-one of the decisionmakers, a
recently appointed African American man, told the plaintiff that he
could not "come here in an acting position and start promoting a lot
of African Americans"-the court denied summary judgment on the
race claim."'
With regard to the race/sex claim, the court, citing Jefferies and
Lam, recognized the possibility that distinct stereotypes may create
bias.266 But it went on to point out the problem of proving what it
called "composite claims": "the more specific the composite class in
which the Plaintiff claims membership, the more onerous [the
plaintiff's burden of persuasion] becomes.""2 Indeed, the Jeffers
court is one of the very few to acknowledge that the recognition of
complex claims does not necessarily ease the way for employees.268
Looking at the racial and gender composition of employees at
what it viewed as the two relevant grade levels, the court found that
out of nineteen office employees at the GS-14 level, there were two
262. Id.
263. Id. at 319 n.1.
264. Id. at 320.
265. See id. at 325.
266. See id. at 326.
267. Id. at 327; see also Johnson v. Dillard's Inc., No. 3:03-3445-MBS, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 71176, at *11 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2007) (quoting Jeffers with approval).
268. Is it significant that the Jeffers judge, William D. Quarles, Jr., is African American?
A fair amount has been written about the effect of gender and, to a lesser extent, race, on
decision making in the federal courts. See Carol T. Kulik, Wlissa L. Perry & Molly B. Pepper,
Here Comes the Judge: The Influence of Judge Personal Characteristics on Federal Sexual
Harassment Case Outcomes, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 69 (2003); Sarah Westergren, Gender
Effects in the Courts of Appeals Revisited. The Data Since 1994, 92 GEO. L.J. 689, 703-08
(2004). A number of other empirical studies conclude that the party affiliation of the president
appointing a federal judge is highly predictive of the result in all civil rights matters. See
Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals,
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1678-86 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle
Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA.
L. REv. 301,304-10 (2004); see also DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 151-
52 (2003) (noting that on issues of gay rights, this factor dwarfed all other personal
characteristics-including race, religion, and sex-in predicting outcomes).
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African American women, thirteen white men, and four white
women.269 At the GS-15 level, which would have come with the
promotion at issue, there were eight men and three women, all
white.27 ° On the basis of what the court itself characterized as
"sparse" statistical evidence, it concluded that no rational jury could
find "special bias" against African American women.27' Similarly,
the court dismissed the age claim for lack of any evidence of
animus."'
B. Wittenburg v. American Express
In Wittenburg v. American Express, the district court, implicitly
and without discussion, recognized a claim for combined sex-age
discrimination.273 The plaintiff was a fifty-one-year-old financial
analyst who lost her job as part of a reduction in force (RIF), which
required the elimination of three out of the four positions in her
department.274 In addition to herself, two men, aged forty-one and
thirty-six, were terminated; a male analyst, aged forty, was
retained. 5 In the previous year, two male analysts over forty were
terminated.276 The plaintiff offered evidence that a thirty-nine-year-
old male analyst had been recently hired, and after her discharge,
two male analysts, ages forty-five and forty-nine, were transferred
into her department.27 ' She also relied on a number of comments
made to her and other employees; there was a reference to the
employer's interest in hiring "younger portfolio managers" and
"junior" people, and another manager laid off a year earlier was told
that a decision had been made to retain younger workers with more
269. Jeffers, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 328.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See id.
273. Wittenburg v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 04-922, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29471 (D. Minn. Sept. 19, 2005), affd, 464 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
2936 (2007). Interestingly, although the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court, it separated
the sex and age claims and considered them individually, without commenting on the district
court's alternative analysis.
274. See id. at **3-4.
275. Id.
276. Id. at *3.
277. See id. at **8-9.
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years of service ahead of them. Wittenburg's supervisor asked her
at the time of termination: 'Your husband has a job doesn't he?"'278
In granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
court dismissed these and other comments as requiring "too great
of an inferential leap" to demonstrate discriminatory animus." 9
Instead, it credited the fact that the plaintiff received a lower
evaluation in 2002 than the male who was retained, even though
the plaintiff maintained that the employer ignored more recent
performance data and that the 2002 data was purposely manipu-
lated so that women were ranked lower.8 °
C. Why Plaintiffs Lost and How They Might Have Won
Looking at the courts' opinions in these cases, it is easy to see how
the plaintiffs went down the road to alleging a complex claim, and
how that decision ultimately led to defeat. Helaine Jeffers, for
example, was passed over for a promotion by a younger white male
and a younger white woman. Bonnie Wittenburg was laid off while
a younger male was retained. These facts are sufficient for a
plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. 21 But as
the Second Circuit noted in a case alleging both age discrimination
and discrimination against married women:
278. See id. at **13-19.
279. Id. at *20.
280. See id. at **21-22.
281. The burden-shifting mode of analysis in employment discrimination actions was
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), and somewhat
modified in the case of Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2003). For a discussion
of the intricacies of Supreme Court doctrine in this area, see Michael J. Zimmer, The New
Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J.
1887, 1889-91 (2004); see also Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing Individual Disparate
Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577, 601 (2001) (suggesting that lower courts have continued
to be skeptical of victims of discrimination).
It appears, however, that in cases without "direct evidence" of discrimination, the courts
still apply the basic McDonnell Douglas framework. A plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case by showing: (1) that she belongs to a racial minority; (2) that she applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that despite her
qualifications, she was rejected; and (4) that after her rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The test has been adopted and appropriately modified
across protected categories and adverse employment actions.
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In our diverse workplace, virtually any decision in which one
employment applicant is chosen from a pool of qualified candi-
dates will support a slew of prima facie cases of discrimination.
The rejected candidates are likely to be older, or to differ in race,
religion, sex, and national origin from the chosen candidate.
Each of these differences will support a prima facie case of
discrimination, even though a review of the full circumstances
may conclusively show that illegal discrimination played no part
whatever in the selection." 2
Once the employer comes forward with a legitimate nondiscrim-
inatory reason for the employment action, the plaintiff's burden
of proving that the reason was a pretext for intentional discrimina-
tion is overwhelmingly difficult to meet." 3 In fact, a complex claim
makes it more-not less--difficult to show pretext, as the Jeffers
court suggested in a less judgmental and conclusory manner than
did the Second Circuit.2"4
Plaintiffs will first attempt to discredit the employer's legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason, but even in that case, pretextual evidence
is required.2"5 Proof of pretext falls into four primary categories. The
most common method is to show that similarly situated employees
of a different race or sex received more favorable treatment.286 But
who is a "comparator" when a complex claim is asserted? With a
single-race claim, it is enough to show that, for example, a similarly
situated white person was not laid off. In a race/sex claim, however,
courts take the view that the comparator must fall within none of
the protected categories that the plaintiff alleges. 2 7 For example, in
a case involving an African American female, the only appropriate
comparator is a white male. In the typical "reduction in force"
situation, as long as one woman or one minority group member
survives the RIF, it will be difficult to rely on comparator evidence
282. Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1337 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
283. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05 (listing possible factors that a plaintiff
may use in attempting to meet the burden).
284. See Jeffers v. Thomspson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 327-28 (D. Md. 2003).
285. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993) (stating that even if the
employer's reason is disbelieved, the employee bears the ultimate burden of proving
intentional discrmination).
286. See LEX R. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 8.04 (2d ed. 1994).
287. See Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich., No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25898,
at **25-27 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007).
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alone. In neither Wittenburg nor Jeffers was the plaintiff able to
identify an appropriate comparator within the narrow confines of
the "similarly situated."2"
A plaintiff can also use statistical evidence to show pretext.289 As
the above cases demonstrate, however, a small statistical sample
will often yield some diversity in those who also suffered the adverse
employment action. The Wittenburg court looked only at the status
of a half-dozen employees. In addition, statistical evidence is easily
manipulated, depending upon the pool of workers analyzed. In
Jeffers, for example, the court considered the racial and gender
makeup of two pay-grade levels in the small department to which
the plaintiff was assigned, rather than the total HHS gender
makeup across the one level for which the plaintiff sought a
promotion, thus weakening her statistical showing. 290 Moreover,
some courts refuse to rely on a small statistical sample, even when
it clearly supports the plaintiffs claim.29'
Another type of evidence that can be used to show pretext is the
testimony of other employees concerning their own treatment in a
discriminatory manner. The admissibility of so-called "me too"
evidence stems from the Supreme Court's recognition that, "evi-
dence that may be relevant to any showing of pretext includes ...
[the employer's] general policy and practice with respect to minority
288. Wittenburg v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 04-922, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29471, at *9 (D. Minn. Sept. 19, 2005), affd, 464 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 2936 (2007); Jeffers, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 328.
289. See LARSON, supra note 286, § 9.
290. See Jeffers, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 328.
291. See, e.g., Causey v. Balog, 929 F. Supp. 900,910 (D. Md. 1996), affd, 162 F.3d 795 (4th
Cir. 1998). The plaintiff was a deputy commissioner for the City of Baltimore Department of
Transportation. When the Department was eliminated in 1992, its duties were subsumed into
another department. Id. at 904. Six managers were given the option of being laid off or taking
a position in the new department. In 1994, six managers, including the plaintiff, were laid off
from the new department. Id. at 910-11. The plaintiff filed suit under Title VII and the ADEA,
contending that he was discriminated against as an older white male. Id. at 904. He presented
evidence showing that he was the only manager who did not receive a lateral transfer, that
the only other manager who received a lower-paying position was also white, and that when
six managers were subsequently laid off from the new department, all were over forty and five
of the six were white. Id. at 911. Recognizing that the Fourth Circuit has held it improper to
rely on statistical evidence of this nature involving small numbers of terminated employees,
the court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to support reliably an
inference of discrimination. See id. at 911-12.
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employment, 292 and that "personal experiences with the company
[bring] the cold numbers convincingly to life. ' 293 But "me too"
evidence poses several problems in multiple claims. First, just as
with statistical evidence, the employee must identify other employ-
ees who fall within the same subclass: for example, other older
women who were subject to a RIF. Additionally, employers can use
"me too" evidence in an exculpatory fashion to show that some older
workers and some women were retained.294 Finally, a number of
circuit courts have limited "me too" evidence by virtue of the "same
supervisor" rule: testimony of other workers is admissible only if the
adverse employment action was taken by the same supervisor who
made the decision currently being challenged by the plaintiff. 295
It was widely anticipated that the Supreme Court would provide
a definitive ruling on "me too" evidence when it granted certiorari
in Mendelsohn v. Sprint/ United Management Co.296 In Mendelsohn,
the plaintiff alleged age discrimination in the defendant company's
RIF and sought to offer testimony of five employees over forty years
old laid off by other supervisors. 297 The Tenth Circuit reversed the
district court's per se exclusion of the evidence, even though the case
was not specifically brought as a "pattern and practice" action,
noting:
Applying Aram buru's "same supervisor" rule in the context of an
alleged discriminatory company-wide RIF would, in many
circumstances, make it significantly difficult, if not impossible,
for a plaintiff to prove a case of discrimination based on circum-
stantial evidence. Conceivably, a plaintiff might be the only
292. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973) (footnote omitted).
293. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
294. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978) (noting that employers
must be allowed some latitude to introduce evidence which bears on their motives and that
proof that employers' "work force was racially balanced or that it contained a dispropor-
tionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of
intent"); see also Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir.
2006), cert. granted, Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 127 S. Ct. 2937 (2007) (allowing
the employer to use statistical evidence to find examples of older workers it had retained).
295. See Honor v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 383 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2004); Williams
v. Nashville Network, 132 F.3d 1123, 1130 (6th Cir. 1997); Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d
113 (2d Cir. 1984); Goff v. Cont'l Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1982); Moorhouse v.
Boeing Co., 501 F. Supp. 390, 392 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 639 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1980).
296. 466 F.3d 1223.
297. Id. at 1225.
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employee selected for a RIF supervised by a particular supervi-
sor. Meanwhile, scores of other employees within the protected
group also selected for the RIF might work for different supervi-
sors. In such cases, the constraints of Aramburu would preclude
a plaintiff from introducing testimony from those other employ-
ees. Applying Aramburu to cases of discrimination based on an
alleged company-wide discriminatory RIF would create an
unwarranted disparity between those cases where the plaintiff
is fortunate enough to have other RIF'd employees in the
protected class working for her supervisor, and those cases
where the plaintiff is not so fortunate. We do not think such
disparity should exist.298
In an amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of Mendelsohn by a number
of public interest organizations, the need to allow "other supervisor"
evidence is explicitly linked to empirical data showing how poorly
employment discrimination plaintiffs fare in court, "even under
existing standards." '299 Amici also argued that the prevalence of
"subtle bias" militates in favor of "other supervisor" evidence: "As
discriminatory practices become less overt, the evidentiary prob-
lems for employees adversely affected by discrimination have
become more pronounced.... It is precisely because the forms of
discrimination have changed that broad evidentiary exclusions ...
are inappropriate."300
But in something of a surprise move,0 ' the Supreme Court
ducked the issue in a unanimous opinion by Justice Thomas.0 2 The
Court found that the district court's in limine ruling was ambiguous
as to whether it was establishing a per se exclusionary rule." 3 Thus,
298. Id. at 1228.
299. Brief for Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law et al. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 11, Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Medelsohn, 128 S. Ct. 1140 (2008)
(No. 06-1221) (citing Clermont & Schwab, supra note 19, at 429, 444, 452), available at
www.abanet.org/publiced/previewfbriefs/pdfs/07-08/06-122 1RespondentAmCu12Civil
Orgs.pdf.
300. Id. at 12-13.
301. According to reports of the December 2007 oral argument, it seemed likely that, at the
least, the Court would require a nexus between the decisionmakers: a connection between the
supervisors in the sense that they conferred or were given the same directions. See Posting
of Jason Harrow to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.comlwp/argument-recap-sprintunited
-managment-co-v-Mendelsohn-by-workplace-prof-blog (Dec. 3, 2007, 18:08 EST).
302. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 128 S. Ct. 1140 (2008).
303. See id. at 1146.
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the circuit court erred in engaging in its own balancing of relevance
and prejudice, and instead should have remanded the matter for
clarification. °4 But in dicta that surely will be the subject of much
debate, Justice Thomas noted that relevance and prejudice are fact-
specific inquiries, and "generally not amenable to broad per se
rules.... [W]hether evidence of discrimination by other supervisors
is relevant in an individual ADEA case is fact based and depends on
many factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the
plaintiff's circumstances and theory of the case."3 °5
'Me too" evidence will thus remain a battleground in the proof of
pretext in all employment discrimination cases. But like the other
modes of proof, it poses even greater challenges for the multiple-
claim plaintiff. Difficult as it is to find employees willing to come
forward with similar allegations of discrimination, the complex
employee must theoretically find someone from the same subset: for
example, not just a woman or an African American, but an African
American woman. If "me too" evidence is limited to employees under
the same supervisor, then, narrowly construed, it means that this
mode of proof will be all but useless to those with multiple claims.
Jeffers produced no "me too" evidence and Wittenburg offered only
a hearsay comment made to an older male, which the court gave no
credence. °6
Finally, there is the possibility of introducing expert testimony
regarding stereotypical thinking to show pretext. In its 1989
plurality decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, °7 the Supreme
Court found expert testimony probative on the issue of sexual
stereotyping in an employment discrimination context.0 8 Many
commentators have called for the increased use of expert testimony,
but it remains exceedingly rare,30 9 and perhaps because of the
expense of retaining an expert, it has been utilized-when at all-in
class or disparate impact actions.310 Moreover, given the changes in
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1147.
306. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
307. 490 U.S. 228,255 (1989) (remarking that expert testimony is used only rarely but can
be quite influential on the issue of causation).
308. Id. at 255.
309. See Selmi, supra note 19, at 573.
310. See, e.g., Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Cal. 1997). In this class
action, alleging both disparate treatment and disparate impact, the district court denied
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the composition of the Court and its subsequent decision in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals"' that restricted the use of expert
testimony in general, any attempt to use this mode of proof
undoubtedly would be hotly contested. Not surprisingly, no expert
testimony was offered in Jeffers or Mendelsohn, nor in any of the
earlier "sex-plus" cases discussed in Part II. In Lam, the only
successful "sex-plus" race case, the court relied on its own under-
standing of subgroup stereotyping.312
Nevertheless, expert evidence holds out great promise for the
complex claimant. With regard to the traditional "sex-plus" cases-
for example, those alleging discrimination against married women
or women with children-plaintiffs have made significant progress.
With foundation support, the Cognitive Bias Working Group of the
Program on Worklife Law, a group of social psychologists, law
professors, and practicing lawyers, spent two years studying and
documenting what has come to be called "the maternal wall."3 ' In
a recent article, Joan Williams provides the resources to help
employment lawyers use social psychology in maternal discrimina-
tion cases. She reviews and digests over one-hundred works by
social scientists." ' In addition, she challenges the notion that, given
this body of scholarship and evidence that automatic stereotypes
can be consciously changed, "maternal wall" discrimination in the
Home Depot's motion to exclude sexual stereotype expert testimony under Daubert. After
plaintiffs defeated Home Depot's motion for summary judgment, Butler v. Home Depot, Inc.,
No. C-94-4335, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16296 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1997), the case was settled
for $87.5 million. See Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, Firm Accomplishment Memo,
at 15-16, available at www.lieffcabraser.com/pdf/resume.pdf; see also Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 141, 145 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (allowing two categories of expert
evidence---opinion and statistical).
311. 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993) (requiring the trial court to determine whether expert
testimony is "scientifically valid" and will assist in understanding or determining a fact in
issue).
312. Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994).
313. Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science To
Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the "Cluelessness" Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. &
EMPL. POL'Y J. 401, 404 (2003); see also Symposium: Litigating the Glass Ceiling and the
Maternal Wall: Using Stereotyping and Cognitive Bias Evidence to Prove Gender
Discrimination, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. PoLY J. 287 (2003).
314. See Williams, supra note 313, passim.
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workplace is a specie of "unconscious" or "subtle" bias.315 She labels
it instead "unexamined bias." '316
Indeed, it appears that this project is having its desired effect. As
notions of the "maternal wall" are introduced into popular discourse,
plaintiffs are beginning to achieve significant victories in court, even
without expert evidence.317 If other types of complex claims are to be
taken seriously and have any chance of success, similar efforts must
be mounted to examine and document complex stereotypes and
cognitive bias.
Could Jeffers or Wittenburg have prevailed on their complex
claims? Were they in fact the victims of complex bias, or rather the
victims of lawyers who failed to understand the pitfalls of multiple
claims? Or perhaps these employers were simply free of bias? It is
impossible to tell from the facts before us. What is clear, however,
is that they could have never prevailed, given the cramped evidence
of pretext put forward.
In order to have a fighting chance in a complex claim, it seems
obvious that the evidentiary net must be cast wide. In fact, the more
specific the complex claim, the wider the net must be to prove
pretext. Both Jeffers and Wittenburg worked for large, hierarchal
organizations: HHS and American Express, respectively.31 In all
likelihood, at any one time, many employees would be seeking
promotions at Jeffers's pay-grade level. Similarly, the RIF that
resulted in Wittenburg's termination presumably went beyond the
four members of her department. Both Jeffers's and Wittenburg's
supervisors had supervisors above them. To determine whether
there was complex discrimination at work, the pool of possible
315. Id. at 405.
316. Id. at 448-49; see also Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous
Condition on Land?, 7 EMP. RTs & EMP. POL'Y J. 459, 463 (2003) (suggesting the use of the
term "unreflective discrimination").
317. See, e.g., Walsh v. Nat'l Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1154-55 (8th Cir. 2003)
(alleging hostility from her supervisor when she returned from maternity leave-including
scrutiny of her work hours when no other employee's hours were scrutinized-and refusal to
allow her to leave to pick up her sick child from daycare, plaintiff was awarded slightly more
than $625,000); Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 973 (W.D. Wis. 2003), affd, 383 F.3d 580
(7th Cir. 2004) (alleging failure to promote based on family responsibilities, plaintiff was
awarded over a million dollars in damages, later reduced).
318. See Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 319 (D. Md. 2003); Wittenburg v. Am.
Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 04-922, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29471, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept.
19, 2005), affd, 464 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2936 (2007).
2009] 1497
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
comparators would have had to be expanded, as would the database
from which statistical evidence could have been gathered. "Me too"
evidence would have had to been sought up the chain of supervisory
command.
There is nothing in discrimination law doctrine that necessarily
prevents some expansion of the evidentiary pool in this manner.
Again, it is impossible to tell whether the limited evidence submit-
ted in these cases was the result of lost discovery battles or poor
lawyering. In either case, change lies with education. As demon-
strated by the "maternal wall" effort, it is critical that social
scientists and lawyers begin to carefully examine and document
complex stereotypes. Only then will the judiciary and fact-finders
begin to take complex claims seriously.
CONCLUSION
In the almost forty-five years since the passage of Title VII, there
surely has been progress toward achieving the goal of equal
opportunity in the workplace. Blatant discrimination may well be
rare, but it is a mistake to relegate remaining bias solely to the
realm of the subtle, unconscious, or implicit. I contend that there is
a good portion of workplace discrimination today that finds its roots
in complex bias.
Complex bias claims show exponential growth at the EEOC level,
and given workplace demographics, it can be predicted that they
will continue to do so. EEOC procedures encourage the filing of
complex claims, whether or not grounded in fact, because of its
crude intake instruments.319 Once they reach the federal courts,
complex claim loss rates closely approach 100 percent.
Those courts that even bother to engage in an intersectional
analysis of complex claims do little more than acknowledge an
obvious proposition: actionable discrimination can be addressed to
a subclass of a protected group. The corollary of that proposition is
never explored, however. The more specific the identity of the
subclass member, the more difficult it becomes to prove that she has
been singled out for discriminatory treatment.32 0 For comparative
319. See supra Part I.A.
320. See supra Part V.C.
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purposes, courts do not look beyond a narrow segment within the
employer's hierarchy. Employers can point to singly protected
workers who have not suffered the adverse employment action
complained of by the complex claimant. To prove that the asserted
reason for the adverse action is pretextual, the complex claimant is
hard pressed to find comparative, statistical, or anecdotal evidence
within these confines.
Lawyers should advocate for, and courts should recognize, the
need to cast a wider evidentiary net in complex claims. Moreover,
social science data relating to the nuanced stereotypes confronted
by the complex subject must become part of the public and judicial
consciousness if courts are to treat complex claims with the
seriousness that they deserve.
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